• IDENTIFICATION
• LEGAL CLUSTERS
• GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS
• TRADE CLUSTERS
• ENVIRONMENT CLUSTERS
• OTHER FACTORS

I. Identification

1. The Issue

2. Description

Table 1.

The Nuclear Plant at Kozloduy consists of six reactors of Soviet design: units 1 to 4 are VVER 440-230 reactors and units 5 to 6 are VVER 1000-320. The VVER's are the Soviet counterpart of western Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) designs. Like all nuclear units based on light water technology, the Soviet VVER design uses water to cool the reactor and to generate steam. Water also acts as moderator, slowing down the neutrons to increase the chances of fissioning. The moderating effect of the water also adds to safety since a water loss slows the nuclear chain reaction.
 
A. VVER 440-230, developed by the Soviets before 1970.
 

Principal Strengths:*

• Six primary coolant loops (providing multiple paths for cooling the reactor), each with a horizontal steam generator (for better heat transfer), that together provide a large volume of coolant. In some respects this design is more forgiving than Western plant designs with two, three or four large vertical steam generators.
• Isolation valves that allow plant operators to take one or more of the six coolant loops out of service for repair while continuing to operate the plant. This feature is found in only a few Western plants.
• Ability to sustain a simultaneous loss of coolant and off-site power, due to coolant pumps and two internal power generators that "coast down" after a shutdown.
• Plant worker radiation levels reportedly lower than many Western plants, due to selection of materials, high-capacity primary coolant-purification system, and water-chemistry control.
• Ability to produce significant amounts of power despite design and I&C deficiencies.

• Accident Localization System--which serves as a reactor confinement--designed to handle only one four-inch pipe rupture. If larger coolant pipes rupture, this system vents directly to the atmosphere through nine large vent valves. In addition, the confinement has very small volume, very poor leak-tightness and poor hydrogen mitigation.
• No emergency core-cooling systems or auxiliary feed water systems similar to those required in Western nuclear plants.
• Major concern about embrittlement (gradual weakening) of the reactor pressure vessel surrounding nuclear fuel, due to lack of internal stainless-steel cladding and use of low-alloy steel with high levels of impurities.
• Plant instrumentation and controls, safety systems, fire-protection systems, and protection for control-room operators are below Western standards.
• Quality of materials, construction, operating procedures and personnel training are considered below Western standards.

Principal Strengths:*

• Steel-lined, pre-stressed, large-volume concrete containment structure, similar in function to Western nuclear plants.
• "Evolutionary" design, use of four coolant loops and horizontal steam generators - both considered improvements by Soviet designers.
• Redesigned fuel assemblies that allow better flow of coolant, and improved control rods.
• Plant worker radiation levels reportedly lower than in many Western plants, apparently due to selection of materials, high-capacity system for purifying primary coolant, and water-chemistry control.

• Substandard plant instrumentation and controls. Wiring of emergency electrical system and reactor-protection system does not meet Western standards for separation--control and safety functions are inter connected in ways that may allow failure of a control system to prevent operation of a safety system.
• Fire-protection systems that do not appear to differ substantially from earlier VVER models, which do not meet Western standards.
• Quality-control, design and construction significantly deficient by U.S. standards.
• Protection measures for control-room operators essentially unchanged from earlier VVER-440 Model V213 design, which does not meet U.S. standards. Unlike all U.S. nuclear plants, and most in Western countries, VVER1000 shave no on-site "technical support center" to serve as a command post for stabilizing the plant in an emergency. Technical support centers were incorporated in U.S. and many Western nuclear plants following the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 in 1979.
• Operating and emergency procedures that fall short of Western standards and vary greatly among operators of VVER-1000 plants.
• Higher power densities and smaller volume of primary and secondary systems result in a somewhat less forgiving and stable reactor.

Many Bulgarian representatives as well as representatives from Russia and other Eastern European countries were critical of the EU programs. In their view EU's process for delivering assistance is too cumbersome. Some also believe that the programs are commercially motivated, providing benefits to Western contractors rather than improving nuclear safety in the recipient countries.

Unit 1 of Kozloduy Nuclear Plant, considered the most dangerous, was closed in February 1995 for safety testing. The G-7 ambassadors to Bulgaria on 21 September handed a letter to then Deputy Minister Kiril Tsochev demanding that the unit be permanently shut down, because it poses a security threat to the region.  Tsochev said that the memorandum was based on outdated analyses and does not take recent improvements to the reactor into account. Two Bulgarian parliamentary committees - on power supply and environment- met to discus the G-7 request. The committees concluded that Bulgaria's nuclear regulator - the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy- should have the final say on Unit 1's restart. The unit was restarted in October 1995, despite Western insistence to keep it closed.

The reactor was again closed in 1996 for safety upgrades and test. After a year of work, experts from Siemens and Gidropres (the Russian conductors of the plant), concluded that block 1 of Bulgaria's Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant can function for at least eight more years. Tests of the reactor's pressure vessel, funded under the European Commission's PHARE program, were carried out to investigate the vessel's ability to withstand sudden cooling, and the multinational team of experts has concluded that the reactor can restart without annealing. It was reconnected to the grid on January 20, 1998.

Many international organizations have advocated the shutdown of the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant. Two of  Bulgaria's neighbors, Romania and Greece, have repeatedly stated their fears about the risks posed by Kozloduy.

" The Demokritos research center has established that if a severe accident were to occur in Kozloduy, the lives lost in Greece alone would reach 132,000...Greenpeace has completed a study that proves that Kozloduy is in essence unnecessary in fulfilling the energy needs of Bulgaria, and that alternatively, Bulgaria could use electric energy, the safer solution."
 
 
 

The facts however somewhat contradict this conclusion. The Bulgarian government is seeking to strike a reasonable balance between safety and meeting domestic consumption. Bulgaria is more than 70 % dependent on external energy sources, according to the European Commission. Oil, gas and nuclear fuels are all imported mainly from Russia. Bulgaria's energy sector accounts for 15% of GDP. In its work program, the current government defines the energy sector as a national priority. The Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant produces around 40% of Bulgaria's electricity and is of vital importance to the county's domestic needs. Bulgaria recognizes the need to comply to EU requirements in order to proceed with its application for full EU membership. On 18 December 1995, the French European Affairs minister had warned that Bulgaria's chances of entering the EU were jeopardized by keeping Kozloduy in service. (see OMRI Daily Digest, 19 December 1995).

 Bulgaria is making considerable efforts to adapt EC energy efficiency and environmental norms. Under the 1993 Nuclear Safety Account Agreement, managed by EBRD Bulgaria undertook to cease operating the reactors 1-4 as soon as alternatives for energy supply would be available. But these are not yet found. A big step in the right direction was made on May 21, 1997, when the unfinished Russian-designed Belene second nuclear power project was killed by a Bulgarian governmental decision, which stated that the plant was technically unsound and economically unviable. It had been considered as a good investment by several western nuclear construction companies, which were hoping they could make profits on upgrading and completing the reactor with Western money. The Bulgarian government, however, stated that energy efficiency is its priority in the energy program, and that a consistent national energy efficiency program in the course of 20 years can save over 1500MW and afford the closure of the four old units of Kozloduy.

 In the parliamentary control session of the National Assembly on 21 February, 1998 the Bulgarian vice premier Evgeni Bakurdjiev announced that the government is not planning to close units 1-4 before the end of their designed lifetime (2005, 2012). He expressed his hopes that the EU will reconsider the agreement of 1993, in light of the positive efforts that Bulgaria has made in the direction of improving the safety of Kozloduy. Some members of Parliament voiced their concerns that behind the pressures for the decommissioning of the old reactors stand some Western commercial interests. There are many other reactors of the same type in Europe ( for example in Russia and Slovakia) but the EU pressures against their host countries are not the same.

 "The reactors are safe and we are ready to prove it," said the managing director of NEC (National Electric Company, which is responsible for the operation of the Kozloduy nuclear plant) Ivan Hinovski. NEC is preparing a three-year program, estimated to cost around $100-150 million, for upgrading the safety of the four small units.

Bulgaria faces the difficult task of proving the safety of Kozloduy to the European experts. NEC introduced its three-year program to the experts from EU, the World Bank, EBRD, and the Fund for Nuclear Safety at the seminar, held in Sofia in March 1998. On March 13, 1998 the Bulgarian press reported that the director of NEC, Ivan Shilishki, announced that an understanding was reached with the EBRD for the gradual decommissioning of the reactors 1 to 4 of Kozloduy by 2004-2005 at a discussion, sponsored by the Bulgarian-English Chamber in London. The Bulgarian government assured the experts from the Bank that it will be a guarantor for the investments of $300 million for the upgrading of units 5 and 6 of the Nuclear Plant.
 

3. Related Cases

                           (1)  : Trade Product   = Utilities [UTIL]
                           (2)  : Bio-geography   = Temperate [TEMP]
                           (3)  : Environmental Problem  = Pollution [POLA]
 

4. Draft Author:    Silvena Krasteva Nikolova

II. Legal Clusters

5. Discourse and Status: DISagreement and IN PROGress

6. Forum and Scope: BULgaria and Regional

7. Decision Breadth: 1

The decision itself to close the Nuclear Plant will directly affect only Bulgaria, but the risk of a nuclear disaster is faced by Bulgaria's neighbors too.

8. Legal Standing: Treaty

III. Geographic Clusters

9. Geographic Locations

           a.  Geographic Domain : Europe

         b.  Geographic Site       : Eastern Europe [EEUR]
 
         c.  Geographic impact   : Bulgaria
 
 
 

Source: U.S. Department of Energy

10. Sub-National Factors: NO

11. Type of Habitat: TEMPerate

IV. Trade Clusters

12. Type of Measure: Regulatory Standard [REGSTD]

13. Direct v. Indirect Impacts: DIR

14. Relation of Trade Measure to Environmental Impact

               b. Indirectly Related to Product         : YES     NUCLear

               c. Not Related to Product                 : NO

               d. Related to Process                        : YES    UTILity

Nuclear energy is essential for Bulgaria, because it provides more than 40 % of the electricity produced by the country's utility, the National Electric Company. Many times thermal plant inefficiencies, fuel shortages and inadequate rainfall for hydropower have accounted for the risen share of nuclear power supplies to nearly 50%.

15. Trade Product Identification: UTILity

16. Economic Data

17. Impact on Trade Competitiveness: LOW

An option voiced by some Western experts, that most Central and Easter European countries have either adopted or are seriously considering, is to use Western financing to build more reactors than are actually needed, and to export the excess energy to Western Europe for the Plants' lifetimes. This however, makes Central and Eastern European countries into nuclear proxies, leaving them to deal with the excessive costs - and risks - of operating nuclear power plants, while countries that have chosen not to use nuclear power for safety and financial reasons benefit from inexpensive energy imports.
 

18. Industry Sector: UTILity

19. Exporters and Importers: MANY and BULgaria

V. Environment Clusters

20. Environmental Problem Type: [POLA], [POLL], [POLS] 

21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species: MANY

Bulgaria has a relatively large number of plant and animal species, reflecting the country's location adjoining several of the great Eurasian biogeographic zones. The greater part of the plant and animal life is central European, mixed with a type that blends Arctic and Alpine characteristics in the high mountains. Steppe species are most characteristic in the northeast and southeast, while the south is rich in sub-Mediterranean species.

22. Resource Impact and Effect: MEDIUM- HIGH and SCALE

23. Urgency and Lifetime: LOW and 100s of Years

24. Substitutes: LIKE products and energy CONServation

This illustrative cost comparison table compares nuclear versus coal specific item cost for similar age and size plants on a $ per Megawatt-hour (10$/Mw-hr = 1 cent/kw-hr) (see Table 3)
 
                    Table 3.

The authors of this table ( The Virtual Nuclear Tourist )reached the conclusion that throughout the world, we need every energy source we can get - including nuclear. Nuclear has a number of advantages that warrant its use as one of the many methods of supplying an energy demanding world. Even with conservation efforts, energy demand has been and will continue to increase.
 
A good summery of the problem of alternative energy sources, faced by countries that rely on nuclear energy is given in the Contemporary Review in 1992: "After Chernobyl several countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, voted to phase out nuclear power as soon as practicable. But when they looked into alternatives they realized that they were even less attractive. Coal is seriously polluting and is contributing to the acid rain and to the greenhouse effect. Oil will become more expensive and it is politically undesirable to rely on it. Hydroelectric power is already used to the practicable limit in most European countries, and the renewable source such as wind and solar are not large-scale credible. So the resolutions to phase out nuclear power have been quietly forgotten."
If economically stable countries like Sweden and Switzerland cannot afford to switch to alternative sources, how can one expect a country like Bulgaria, in a time of political and economic transition, to be able to deal successfully with this problem.
 

VI. Other Factors

25. Culture: NO

26. Trans-Boundary Issues: YES

27. Rights: NO

28. Relevant Literature

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