CASE NUMBER: 360
CASE MNEMONIC: TUNA3
CASE NAME: 1997 Tuna-Dolphin Dispute
I. IdentificationThe focus on tuna and dolphins began thirty years ago when US tuna fishermen discovered that adult yellowfin tuna have a tendency to travel beneath pods of dolphins. The fishing industry thus employed a method of encirclement in order to catch the tuna below the dolphins resulting in the death of thousands of dolphins caught, drowned, and/or crushed by the purse-seine nets alongside the tuna [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997].
Public uproar during the 1980s pressured Congress by 1990 to pass the “dolphin-safe” labeling law which gave consumers the option of purchasing dolphin safe canned tuna or tuna that could not be labeled dolphin safe. (At that point, dolphin deaths were estimated at 100,000 per year) [Financial Times, July 31, 1997]. By definition, dolphin safe means that the encirclement method was not used to catch the tuna. By 1992, restrictions of the 1990 law were tightened by Congress such that any and all tuna caught by the encirclement method were banned from the US market altogether. From then on, all canned tuna within the US was required by law to be marked with the dolphin safe label. Until now [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997].
The newest tuna-dolphin legislation was passed 99-0 by the US Senate on Wednesday, July 30, 1997. (Similar legislation, H.R. 408, was passed by the House earlier on May 21, 1997). The new Senate bill calls for the lifting of the 1992 embargo on tuna imports from the Eastern Pacific [Associated Press, August 1, 1997]. With initial implementation of the bill, resulting in a compromise won by its opponents, the US legal definition of “dolphin safe” will be tightened, thus prohibiting not only the encirclement method but the use of any other fishing techniques that seriously injure or kill dolphins from being labeled “dolphin safe”. However, as early as March of 1999, the Secretary of Commerce may change the definition to include encirclement practices with the stipulation that no dolphins are killed or critically injured [Chicago Sun Times, August 3, 1997]. In order to uphold this stipulation, each fishing boat will be manned by an independent monitor to certify that no dolphin deaths have occurred. [Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1997].
Encirclement will only fall under the category of dolphin safe if it is determined to not have “a significant adverse impact on dolphins. (Senator Barbara Boxer, a leading opponent of relaxed standards on dolphin safe labeling, pushed for a scientific study to be conducted on the effects of encirclement on dolphins- a three-year study which ultimately became a provision of the bill ) [Chicago Sun Times, August 3, 1997].
One of the biggest problems for opponents of the bill is over the issue of encirclement. Whether it kills dolphins or not, is it a form of mental torment? Many environmental groups are grappling with this question. The Humane Society of the United States, in particular, is weary of the encirclement compromise within the bill’s legislature. They heavily criticize the encirclement process, charging the method as one in which high-speed chases, that sometimes last for hours, exhaust the dolphins leaving them frightened and confused [Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1997].
Another problem opponents charge as being a step backward for legislation and dolphin protection is yet another compromise reached Friday, July 25, 1997. The bill would allow tuna to be sold in the US "even if dolphins were killed" in the process; but the food industries would not be permitted to stamp the canned tuna with a dolphin safe label.
A majority of press coverage has focused on this issue of encirclement and unsafe tuna which largely contributed to the negative slant framing the tuna-dolphin bill over the months edging up to the final vote in Congress.
Greenpeace's stance on the issue requires an in depth analysis of the root of the controversy and means for solving the overriding problem of dolphin deaths and safety. Greenpeace supports the tuna-dolphin bill. They believe that this bill is the best and only option possible that will permanently put an end to the dolphin slaughter, not aid in the continuance of the practice [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997]. Their reasoning is twofold:
1) Greenpeace claims that although the 1990 labeling law helped greatly to raise public awareness of the issue, dolphin deaths by the thousands continue to persist in the Eastern Pacific; and yet, the “dolphin safe” label has led most US consumers to conclude the problem has been solved. Nevertheless, Greenpeace claims that the US embargo and labeling practice have had little influence over the fishing practices outside the US, specifically in the Eastern Pacific. The encirclement method continues to predominate over non-US fishing industries at a similar rate of that during the initial emergence of dolphin-safe labeling in the US [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997].
Figures show that the number of dolphin deaths in 1996 fell below 3,000. Greenpeace argues that the decline in dolphin deaths was a result of a voluntary agreement by several of the “world’s tuna fishing nations” to reduce dolphin deaths to less than 5,000 per year by 1999- an agreement which was necessitated by their inability to access the US market. Thus, Greenpeace claims, it was this voluntary international agreement, adopted by the Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission, which caused the decline and not the dolphin safe labeling practices established by the US government [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997].
The new methods employed by these non-US countries to obtain tuna include escape hatches in nets, and “dolphin safety panels.” Additionally, divers are encouraged to assist in the release of confused dolphins from the nets, as well as putting boats into reverse allowing the nets to loosen and the dolphins to free themselves [Greenpeace USA, 1997].
By lifting the 1990 US embargo therefore, Greenpeace views that action as a well-calculated one, through which the US may be free to enter into a binding international agreement. If this were to happen, Greenpeace contends, such a binding and international agreement could serve as a model for other international fishing treaties, ultimately aiding in the overall, worldwide protection of dolphins. For Greenpeace, an international approach to the problematic, tuna-dolphin debate is the solution.
2) Timing is everything. Greenpeace speculates a decline to implement such legislation now, as that passed by the US Senate along with an effort to enter into negotiations for a binding international agreement, would be a mistake. First, the position of the US to dictate international policy on dolphins and tuna is weakening. In 1990, the US controlled about 48% of the world’s tuna market. In 1995, that percentage sunk to less than 22% [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997].
Secondly, the 11 countries which partook in the voluntary agreement in 1992, later signed the Panama Declaration in 1995. This declaration has crucial bearing on the tuna-dolphin debate according to Greenpeace. The Panama Declaration represents a PLEDGE TO NEGOTIATE a legally binding agreement on the condition that Congress reopens the US market. Thus, a commitment from the Eastern Pacific to seriously reduce dolphin deaths toward a goal of none, to implement an effective program of incentives for those who abandon their practice of dolphin slaughter, and to permit the US to lead the struggle for hemispheric dolphin protection by placing trade sanctions on nations which fail to maintain such standards of compliance is conditional on the passage of the “tuna-dolphin bill”. Greenpeace believes that if Congress had failed to act on July 30, 1997 and the Panama Declaration were to collapse, the US would lose its leverage to influence fishing practices across the world as the tuna fishing nation’s would turn their focus on rebuilding markets elsewhere [Greenpeace USA op-ed, 1997].
Apparently, the White House was concerned over a loss of US influence in the global marketplace as well. This was evident through the visible effort extended by the White House in lobbying Congress for legislation which would rollback strict precautions, enough that Mexico would not abandon the US market, reverting to markets of more favorable (in other words, fewer) environmental restrictions.
"Opponents of the bill contend that the US is bowing to trade pressures at the expense of dolphin protection" [Financial Times, July 31, 1997]. The Clinton administration argues that the tuna- dolphin bill, which allows for the implementation of the Panama Declaration is the solution for reconciliation amongst the “competing pressures of global trade and environmental protection” [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 7, 1997].
II. Legal Clusters[AGR]ee and [COMP]lete
The International Dolphin Conservation Program Act was passed 99-0 by the US Senate on Wednesday, July 30, 1997. An earlier, somewhat similar version of this bill, was passed by the House side on May 21, 1997.
The House version of the bill, known as the International Dolphin Conservation Act, also sought to amend those sections of the Marine Mammal Protection Act that apply to the “dolphin-safe” labeling law of 1990 and tuna fishing practices within the US [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 14, 1997]. Unlike the Senate version of the bill, the House called for a much more aggressive leap forward in terms of overturning the 1992 embargo. It would have immediately granted the dolphin-safe label to all new tuna imports [Associated Press, August 1, 1997].
The House, however, accepted a Senate compromise wherein tuna imports would be sold in the US whether it received approval or not as dolphin-safe; however, tuna which was caught using purse-seine nets, employing the encirclement method, and/or any other method which resulted in the death or serious injury of dolphins would not receive the dolphin-safe label. In the meantime, the Senate has lobbied for a scientific study to be conducted on the fishing procedure. If it is discovered that there are no adverse effects on dolphins (given that no dolphin deaths occur) then tuna caught with the encirclement method will receive a preliminary seal of approval as dolphin-safe as early as March of 1999. The Secretary of Commerce will be required to make a final ruling by December 31, 2002. [Associated Press, August 1, 1997].
Some environmental groups charge that this provision of the bill will kill the legislation due to the fact that it will now take three years for full implementation [Congress Daily, July 24, 1997]. The measure of the bill would implement the 1995 Panama Declaration, an international agreement signed by 11 of the top fishing nations. Whether or not these nations will hold out is a widespread fear amongst those in opposition to the Senate compromise. Final approval for the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act is pending on President Clinton’s signature.
[REGION]
Though the US Congress has sole authority over passage of the bill, itself, it does not remain isolated from the regional influence of the Eastern Pacific. Mexico and other countries with significant tuna fleets have felt unjustly alienated from the US market, thus challenging US law under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Clinton’s administration has been criticized as weakening the tuna-dolphin standard in an attempt to "avoid the public-relations disaster of a US environmental law being overruled by an international trade body" [Sierra Club, July 17, 1997]. By altering domestic law, the bill will enact a highly controversial international agreement.
Number of Parties Affected: 11
The newest tuna-dolphin legislation immediately affects the relationship between Mexico and the United States; it fully intends to impact the eleven countries committed to the Panama Declaration by drawing them into an international struggle against dolphin mortality. The bill, as it stands, limits the number of dolphin deaths each year to no more than 0.2% of the total estimated species population until 2000, and 0.1% set for 2001 (with an eventual goal of zero mortality rate) [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 6, 1997]. Ultimately, all 100 members of GATT are expected to be affected.
The International Dolphin Conservation Program Act is a law which will implement a Treaty, the Panama Declaration.
III. Geographic Clusters
a. Geographic Domain: North America [NAMER]
The geographic species domain of dolphin pods and the schools of tuna which travel beneath them covers the entire stretch of the tropical eastern Pacific Ocean from California to Chile. It is a “phenomenon” unique to that specific area of the Pacific Ocean [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 21, 1997]. The specific legislation of the case, however, falls under the domestic law of the US which therein affects the trade practices of many Latin American and to a lesser extent, European countries.
b. Geographic Site: Eastern Pacific Ocean
c. Geographic Impact: US, Belize, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Panama, Spain, Mexico, Vanuatu, and Venezuela
IV. Trade ClustersThe tuna-dolphin bill terminates a US embargo on tuna caught with purse-seine nets up to a mile long and 50 feet deep [Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1997]. The legislation permits tuna to be imported once again into the US by Latin American fishing boats in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.
The 1990 dolphin-safe labeling law read that "no dolphins could be chased, harassed or encircled with purse seine nets in the pursuit of tuna sold in this [US] country." The majority of Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela, alienated themselves from the US market with their continual practice of employing mile-long nets in their pursuit of tuna [Portland Press Herald, July 15, 1997].
The newest form of the tuna-dolphin bill is set to alter the definition of dolphin-safe after a three-year study has been completed by the Commerce Department on the effects encirclement practices have on dolphins. The bill will include tuna caught by the net-encirclement method so long as no dolphin deaths are observed. Opponents of the bill argue that the observation of dolphin deaths is an impossible test, that such injuries as "broken jaws, torn fins, and separation of mothers from babies" take place under water, unobservable from the perspective of onboard monitors [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 14, 1997].
Similar to the initial GATT Tuna-Dolphin dispute, this bill seeks to directly influence and change the fishing practices which result in concomitant dolphin deaths. It is hoped that with the implementation of the Panama Declaration, a global solution may be reached. A revised goal, as previously stated, is to decrease dolphin mortality to zero; 0.1% of the total estimated species’ population by 2001.
a. Directly Related to Product: [YES]
The trade measure in question is related to the treatment of tuna imports, which were previously banned in 1992. The current measure lifts that ban. It will also implement the first international agreement for protecting the oceans by setting legally binding restrictions on bycatch. Specifically, it will require the tuna fisheries of the eastern Pacific to set stringent regulations on tuna catch levels such that the stability of tuna populations remains stable. In addition, the international legislation will protect specific dolphin populations while simultaneously maintaining a sustainable fishing industry [Greenpeace USA, 1997].
b. Indirectly Related to Product: [YES]
Bycatch is the "inadvertent catch of fish and marine species other than those targeted by the fishing vessel." The new agreement will not only protect dolphins, but set limits on the by catch of sharks, sea turtles, bill fish, and juvenile tuna [Greenpeace USA, 1997].
c. Not Related to Product: [NO]
d. Related to Process: [YES]
The 1990 law had indirect consequences on byproducts of tuna catch. It initially encouraged tuna fishermen to use alternative practices to the widespread setting of nets; unfortunately, other ocean species were negatively affected including dolphin food species [Star Tribune, July 21, 1997].
The following is a list of “Dolphin-safe tuna brands sold in the US [Ocean Alert, 1995]:
* Starkist (H.J. Heinz)
* Empress (Mitsui Foods Inc., USA)
* Chicken of the Sea
* Bumble Bee
* Deep Sea Tongol (Humble Whole Foods import)
* Ocean Light (Humble Whole Foods import)
* Captain’s Choice (Safeway brand)
* Natural Sea (Cornucopia Natural Foods)
(The US Tuna Federation and Starkist have both declined to take a position on the bill) [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 21, 1997].
Industry Output ($): $1.4 billion US canned tuna market [Chicago Sun-Times, August 3, 1997]
Employment: No exact figures found. However, according to the Tuna Foundation, industry's position on the issue is split. In terms of employment and the economic incentive of lifting the ban on tuna, many of the Tuna Foundation's boat owners are eager to return to the eastern Pacific Ocean. In opposition to their enthusiasm, lie several canners and other boat owners who remain skeptical of a change in the dolphin-safe definition [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 21, 1997].
Though the consequence of using the encirclement method with purse-seine nets endangers the lives of thousands of dolphins each year in exchange for the efficiency and quantity of tuna caught, the dolphin population is not nearing total depletion. The consequential death of dolphins corresponds more with a notion of humanity rather than one of economics. Perhaps the ban was lifted in 1997 due to international trade pressures; but it was instated in 1992 as a "noble struggle to save our friend," the dolphin.
Non
Durable Manufacturing (N) Foods [FOOD]
V. Environment ClustersSOURCE PROBLEMS: Species Loss: Sea [SPLS]
The purse-seine nets have been recorded as having caused the deaths of an estimated 7 million dolphins since the late 1950s [Hartford Courant, July 18, 1997]. Adult tuna follow pods of dolphins to assist in their search for food. Dolphins as mammals must breathe surface air which makes them an easy target for tuna fishing fleets [Star Tribune, July 21, 1997].
Critics of the encirclement-netting method soon enlisted a new practice wherein they cast nets around "free-swimming schools of younger tuna", not dolphins, and around mature tuna that gathered beneath "logs and other shadow-casting objects" near the surface of the ocean. Yet this method resulted in the unfortunate death of sea turtles, sharks, marlin and other sailfish [Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1997].
Name: eastern Pacific dolphin
Type: Mammal
Diversity: spinner and spotted dolphin
[Portland Press Herald, July 15, 1997].
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
The threat to dolphin species is not immediate; the urgency of the case rests in the historic opportunity to unite 12 countries under the Panama Declaration with an internationally binding agreement to struggle cooperatively toward the preservation of dolphin life.
VI. Other FactorsThe US is a dolphin-friendly nation; the cultural sentiment towards dolphins (represented distinctly with the symbol of “Flipper”) influences public opinion, and to some extent, whether it be great or small, helps to shape US policy as it relates to animal rights.
In a successful attempt to influence tuna-dolphin legislation in the US, Mexico and other Latin American nations made claims that the 1990 dolphin-safe labeling laws and embargo violated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). They argued that the restrictions on tuna imports into the US market violated the flow of ‘free trade’. Mexico even went so far as to threaten the US with the pledge to submit a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization [Hartford Courant, July 18, 1997]. In fact, Mexico suspended its participation in the voluntary agreement, to lessen the dolphin mortality rate, in protest of Congress’ inaction to reopen the US market. Accused of dodging negative publicity, the Clinton Administration insists its support of the bill’s legislation is an effort to prevent the undermining of future free- trade agreements and to ensure the strength of environmental US law.
* Associated Press. "Tuna-Dolphin Bill Sent to President," Staff. August 1, 1997.
* Chicago Sun-Times. "Compromise Weighs Impact on Dolphins; Congress OKs end to Tuna Embargo," Allen Freedman. August 3, 1997.
* Congress Daily. "White House Lobbying on Senate Tuna-Dolphin Measure," Staff. July 22, 1997.
* Congress Daily. "Administration Seeks Resolution to Tuna- Dolphin Dispute," Staff. July 24, 1997.
* Financial Times. "Senate Votes to Lift Tuna Embargo," Nancy Dunne. July 31, 1997.
* Greenpeace USA. "Lift the Dolphin-Safe Label -- And Save Dolphins," Barbara Dudley. 1997.
* Greenwire. "Dolphins: Clinton Admin Pushes for Senate Tuna Bill," Staff. July 22, 1997.
* Hartfourd Courant. "Don't Drop Dolphin Protection," Staff. July 18, 1997.
* Los Angeles Times. "Senate Drafts Compromise on Tuna-Netting Methods; Fisheries: Proposal Would Allow U.S. Sales, But Withhold ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Label, Even if Mammals Are Killed in the Process, Plan Is Called Temporary," James Gerstenzang. July 26, 1997.
* Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. "Congress Again Debating Changing Dolphin Safe Tuna Rules; Legislation Would Lift Some Import Restrictions; Floor Fight Expected," Alan Greenblatt. July 6, 1997.
* Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. "Bill's Defeat Could Ensure Dolphin Safety," Staff. July 14, 1997.
* Ocean Alert. "IMMP: Dolphin-Safe Tuna Brands & Co.'s,"
Earth Island Institute. * Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. "Bill Changes ‘Dolphin Safe’ Label
for Tuna; Purse-Seine Netted Fish Could Be Sold in the U.S.,"
Don Hopey. July 21, 1997.
* Portland Press Herald. "Don't Make a Mockery of Dolphin-Safe
Tuna; Latin American Nations Shut Themselves Out of the U.S.
Market," Staff. July 15, 1997.
* Sierra Club. "The Great Green Hope; Vice-President Al Gore's
Environmental Record," Paul Rauber. July 17, 1997.
* Star Tribune. "Dolphin-Safe? New Law Improves Tuna Label,"
Staff. July 21, 1997.
*
Dolphin Society
*
Earth Island
* "Greenpeace,"
Greenpeace/
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