Space Garbage (SPACEGAR)
CASE NUMBER: 124
CASE MNEMONIC: SPACEGAR
CASE NAME: SPACE Garbage
A. IDENTIFICATION
1. The Issue
On April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first human to
experience the exhilaration of climbing out of mans cradle.
Aboard the Vostok 1, Gagarin spent about 90 minutes orbiting
Earth. Since this first attempt to escape the terrestrial
confines of mans habitat, many more spacecraft have been
launched into the skies above. Although some of these craft are sent
into deep space on exploratory missions, most are not set free to
roam the universe. Instead, they remain in orbit around the planet.
The combination of launchings, intentional destructions of
spacecraft, and other human activity has led to the amassment of
debris in space orbiting the Earth and bitterly ironic situation.
Due to the debris left in space during these activities, every
attempt to escape the limits on knowledge and exploration makes
it increasingly harder to so. Since space debris is potentially
dangerous not only to crafts sent into space, but also to humans
that may be included in the missions, humanity is becoming its
own greatest obstacle to learning more about the universe.
2. Description
Since the 1950s, when humanity officially became a space-
faring race (at least capable of putting things into orbit and
going to the Moon), people have been launching rockets with
commercially, militarily, or scientifically relevant payloads,
such as satellites. Many of these satellites will remain in orbit,
perhaps for centuries. However, there is a growing problem with
the 'important' or worthwhile orbits (Low Earth Orbit or LEO and
Geosynchronous Orbit or GEO): specifically, that there is a lot
of junk flying around up there. Technically, the proper terminology
is orbital debris. Orbital debris can impact satellites,
spacecraft or space stations, causing damage and potentially
further debris (from a satellite breakup), or potentially
endangering humans (big enough collissions could, although none
has as yet).
Orbital debris comes from: rocket engines or boosters which
reached orbit but have not re-entered the atmosphere; satellites
which broke apart before reaching a useful orbit; parts of
satellites broken off by meteoroids. Meteoroids are also and
have always been a concern, but not to the same degree: they come
from outside the atmosphere and leave Earth orbit. Human-made
debris, however, remains in orbit. The danger is from the size and
velocity of debris; any objects travelling at very high velocities
are dangerous. Even an object as small as a .2 millimeter chip
of paint can pose a significant danger at such a speed (as happened
in 1983 to the Shuttle Challenger, the chip cracked -- but did not
break -- a window.) There is a significant volume of debris in
orbit, perhaps 70 tons worth; however, the probability of an
impact at any given time or for any given satellite/vehicle/station
is still fairly low: 70 tons of debris are spread through many cubic
miles of space.
According to the OTA document entitled "Orbiting Debris", a
number of concerns are relevant: 1) orbital debris could severely
restrict a number of orbits in the next several decades if the
problem is not dealt with; 2) not enough data exist to even say
how much debris there is, much less how to reduce the threat of it;
3)building future launch vehicles and satellites to return to Earth
when finished will reduce the future threats; 6) the presence of
debris can pose a risk to human life; 7) all space-faring nations
will have to be involved [defined later]; 8) an international
treaty devoted to debris may become possible, and necessary, in
the future.
Potential problems for finding a solution to deal with space
debris include: the difficulty of tracking small objects, and
thus predicting that/whether a collision will occur; the mass/number
of nonuseful objects in orbit (one source suggests about 300,000 kg
of human-built materials in orbit). Satellites and rocket boosters
are large enough to track from the ground, but debris from the
break-up of a satellite can be very small and spread over a large
"area" of orbit, causing even more problems.
There are approximately 4,000 objects in orbit that can be
tracked, including operating satellites, used boosters (50% of
all debris!), and debris (most commonly from a breakup before or on
reaching orbit). There are many smaller objects in space that
are too small to be tracked; most of these are less dangerous, but
one report compared the impact of a 1-cm aluminum sphere traveling at
10km/sec to that of a 400lb safe traveling at 60 mph. (Ouch!)
However, fortunately, current and projected spacecraft and
station sheilding can protect against debris of this size. There
have been over 3000 successful launches in the past 37 years; this
works out to an average of about 90 launches per year. Current plans
call for perhaps 100 planned satellite launches (by the U.S., Europe,
Japan, international systems, and "the rest of the world") in the
next eight years; this is a lighter volume than in the past.
At present, each nation/Space Agency must come up with its
own solution to the problem, whether by using technologies that will
permit greater retrieval, making certain that used object return
to Earth, or by adding protective layers to satellites, vehicles,
and stations. However, if all space-faring nations do not endeavor
to deal with the problem, future efforts in space will be more
costly, more dangerous, and harder to do.
Since 1957, more than 20,000 objects have been placed into
orbit as the result of 3555 launches. In 1993, it was estimated
by experts at the European Space Debris Conference that there was
currently about 7,000 objects over a centimeter in orbit around
the earth. Less than a year later, this number could now be over
three times this amount. Although NASA's current count of catalogued
objects in orbit is 7,260, there are approximately 40,000
untracked golfball-sized objects, and if objects under one
centimeter are included in a count, this number could be as high
as 60,000 or more objects. In addition, the total number of objects
larger than a millimeter could be in the millions, but less than
5 percent of all orbiting objects are actually working craft.
Unfortunately, the other 95 percent of these orbiting
man-made materials are abandoned satellites, making up about 21
percent, upper stages of rocket boosters, making up about 16 percent,
fragments of satellites and upper stages, making up about 45
percent, and mission-related objects, such as lens covers,
separation bolts or clamp bands, making up about 12 percent.
Spent nuclear reactors are also among the debris. Every
launching results in a new genesis of debris. "At a height of
about sixty miles, the first stage of a three-stage vehicle burns
out and falls back to earth, usually into the ocean. Then,
having boosted the craft into low-earth orbit, stage two burns out
and is released amid a shower of metal shards. Stage three positions
the payload into its final trajectory before it too is released,
often in another flurry of debris." In addition, about eighty
explosions resulting from the combustion of inactive rocket
casings, and intentional weapons tests have contributed
significantly to the debris. The extent of fragmentation due to
intentional explosions is debatable, yet it has contributed to
nearly 10 million pieces of debris orbiting Earth. The more
common explosion of spent rocket stages often happens due to the
corrosion of thin walls separating different fuels, which then
combust when mixed. The remnants of some rockets, such as the
Delta rockets, can lie dormant for three years before exploding.
Although large objects, such as the defunct satellites and
upper stages, account for nearly 99.97 percent of the total
debris mass, these objects account for only two-tenths of 1 percent
of the total number of objects in orbit. Minute untrackable
particles from 1 millimeter to 10 centimeters in size are of the
greatest threat to spacecraft and astronauts, but these particles are
the most difficult to observe. An object orbiting the Earth
traveling at orbital speed, about five kilometers a second, a
fragment the size of a pea could shatter a functioning satellite,
even though the probability that an individual spacecraft with a
30-square-meter cross section would collide with a fragment in
low earth orbit, that is, a highly trafficked orbit below about 2,000
kilometers, is about 0.1 percent per year per million debris
particles. By comparison, a BB-size chunk of aluminum traveling
at orbital velocity would have the same destructive potential as
a bowling ball moving at sixty miles an hour; and a marble-size
aluminum sphere can be as destructive as a 400-pound safe falling
from the roof of a ten-story building. A small particle
colliding with exposed objects such as glass window panels or
sensor lenses will damage an area twenty to twenty-five times the
diameter of the debris particle. Obviously, as the amount of
fragments increases, so, too, does the chance of collision.
The smaller fragments orbiting Earth present still another
particularly unpleasant dilemma. Since even such small particles
contain enough energy to destroy larger crafts, any collision
will produce more particles. Consequently, small particles will
proliferate, irrespective of human activity, at an exponentially
increasing rate. "NASA scientists believe the great velocities
at which space particles collide (about eight to ten kilometers a
second) could be destructive enough to generate hundreds or
perhaps thousands of additional particles, depending on the size of
the impacting fragment." In fact for every order of magnitude
decrease in the diameter of the fragments, the number of
fragments produced increases by 2.5 orders of magnitude. "The
proliferation of these particles could snowball into a chain
reaction of collisions with other satellites or particles, and
the result might be a debris belt around the Earth. Should this belt
tear into a discarded satellite, still more debris would be
generated, as would the potential for greater destruction." It
has been estimated that a collision between a softball-size piece
of debris and a larger part of debris the size of a spent rocket
might produce 10,000 marble-size fragments and more than a
million untrackable fragments. In 1963, Ernest Peterkin predicted
that 318 new catalogued objects would appear every year. His
estimate has been relatively accurate through the mid-1980s.
The primary culprits in the debris scandal are, of course,
the United States and the former Soviet Union. Although the former
Soviet Union was responsible for more than 70% of all launches
and satellite break-ups over the past 25-30 years, the United States
is equally responsible for the current debris problem. This is due
largely to differing orbiting altitudes. The orbit of an object
the size of a glass marble orbiting 300 miles high will not decay
for about a year; at an altitude of 500 miles, the same objects
orbit will not decay for about 90 years; and at 900 miles, the
orbital decay time could be centuries. Debris produced from
Soviet satellite missions and other launchings were usually
placed in lower orbits than US spacecraft and, thus, reentered
Earth's atmosphere sooner. So, despite putting a larger amount of
debris in space over time, the current debris population is rather
evenly distributed between the former USSR and the US.
Thus, the extent that humans can expand their horizons,
mental and physical, may depend on their ability to limit themselves.
Space debris threatens both life and equipment. Although US and
Russian space suits provide protection for astronauts against
objects up to 1 millimeter, an encounter with anything larger
could prove fatal. Likewise, according to scientists, there is a
1 percent chance that the Hubble Space Telescope will collide
with a piece of debris large enough to severely damage it within its
seventeen year lifespan. Manned space missions have already
encountered the threat of debris. For instance, in 1983, the US
space shuttle Challenger was struck by a flake of paint only 0.2
millimeter wide that cracked a window. Fortunately, the flake
did not cause any serious damage, but the window did need
replacing. Despite increasing attention on space debris, efforts
to deal effectively with it have fallen short for various
reasons. One primary reason for this lack of progress is that there
are no formal laws or treaties that have any impact on the control of
space debris.
In 1967, under United Nations auspices, the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies was signed by over one hundred countries. Among other
things, this treaty established the liability of State parties
declaring "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty." Specifically, the Treaty declares that each State Party
from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the
Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space... The
Space Treaty was followed be the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects in 1972, which
established that "both intergovernmental organizations and State
parties are liable on the basis of fault for damage of their space
objects, launch vehicles, or component parts thereof may cause in
outer space." However, several legal problems specific to space
debris have since risen.
First, Article VIII of the Space Treaty states that A State
Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into
outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over
such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or
on a celestial body. Although this Article seems rather straight
forward, definitional questions concerning whether debris falls
under this Article at all as either a "space object" or "component
part," and whether jurisdiction and control over space objects is
permanent have been major obstacles to creating a working law.
As a result of differing legal definitions of space object and
component part, the only classes of space debris specifically
identified in international law are operational debris, to the
exclusion of inactive payloads, fragmentation debris,
microparticulate matter, and litter."
Next, closely related to the definitional problem of space
debris, questions over jurisdiction and control arose. Although
both active and inactive payloads are considered to be under the
permanent jurisdiction and control of the State party referred to
in Article VIII, a doctrine of permanency applies only to
identifiable space objects. So, whether space debris falls under
the permanent sovereignty of a State party is still unclear since
most space debris is unidentifiable fragments. Moreover, the
Space Treaty prevents any state from interfering with a space object
that is under the jurisdiction of another. What this implies is that
even if one state wants to remove debris from space, any claim or
action to do so may be opposed simply because jurisdiction will
not have been established. Later, during negotiations of the
Liability Convention, in the attempt to deal with the increasing
importance of outer space, negotiators were more concerned with which
artificial objects should be considered space objects, rather
than what happens to them after they become inactive. As a result,
the negotiations for the Liability Convention did not take into
account the risks posed specifically by space debris. Following
this rationale, it is generally acknowledged in international law
that damage to the outer space environment per se does not fall
under the jurisdiction of the Treaty. Therefore, States cannot
be held legally responsible for the mere presence of much of
what is generally considered space debris in orbit. In effect, no
state is responsible for space debris, yet no state necessarily
has the right to remove it unless there is a clear establishment of
jurisdiction.
Finally, terms of liability as expressed in the Liability
Convention were made with active, controlled satellites in mind.
Article III states that "In the event of damage being caused
elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to a space object of
one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space
object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable
only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for
whom it is responsible" (Art. III). However, the Article does not
determine if the damage caused must be foreseeable. Accordingly,
the Convention appears to be primarily concerned with a possible
collision between [active] space objects." The fault rationale
seems wholly inappropriate for space debris since damages
incurred by it are, for the most part, unforeseeable.
In spite of the absence of a legal regime, the consciousness
of the world community has been rising, especially among
scientists. Fortunately, even if governments ignore the problem
of space debris, the scientists that work for them cannot.
Scientists are acutely aware of the hazards of debris to research and
exploration, yet it required two major incidents, one involving a
Soviet satellite and the other involving an American craft, to
force governments to acknowledge space debris as a real threat.
First, in 1977, the Soviet Union launched a nuclear-powered
satellite that was periodically reboosted to maintain orbit. The
satellite, Cosmos 954, was designed to expel the nuclear reactor
to a high stage orbit of a lifetime of 300-1000 years once the short
lifetime of the satellite was over. Following this expulsion the
main body was then to fall harmlessly back to Earth. Instead,
the Cosmos 954 malfunctioned and re-entered with the reactor still
attached on January 24, 1978. Radioactive debris rained on a
800-kilometer area over the Great Slave Lake in northwestern
Canada. Although the Liability Convention was an option in
negotiating a settlement to the clean-up, it was never actually
activated. Clean-up cost reached fourteen million dollars,
Canada claimed six, and the Soviet Union paid three. The second
incident revolved around the re-entry of the Skylab Orbital Workshop
in 1979. As it re-entered over the Atlantic Ocean and southwestern
Australia, Skylab broke up into five large pieces which then
showered a 1000-kilometer long, 200-kilometer wide area with
debris. About 500 major debris pieces were recovered in
Australia.
Together, the Cosmos 954 and Skylab reentries increased
awareness that orbiting objects could pose hazards, that the products
of human space activities did not vanish into infinite blackness
when their usefulness ended. The reentries helped create a climate
in which orbital debris research and awareness-building efforts
could continue to develop."
On July 27-29, 1982, the first major conference dedicated to
orbital debris was held. Over 100 participants attended
including representatives from NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratories,
Battelle Institute, Lockheed Sunnyvale, the National Science
Foundation, and the Max Planck Institut in West Germany. Following
this conference, in 1984 the orbital debris workshop at the Committee
for Space Research XXV meeting in Graz, Austria became the first
truly international workshop dedicated solely to orbital debris.
Then, on February 11, 1984, President Ronald Reagan included
space debris as part of the official US space policy saying that "All
space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris.
Design and operations of space tests, experiments and systems
will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris..."
Finally, in 1989, momentum culminated in the Interagency Group's
Report on Orbital Debris which drew on broad-based input from
US Federal agencies." Although not producing any really new
evidence, it legitimized the efforts of members of the orbital
debris community to deal directly with space debris and raised
awareness outside the US.
Ultimately, in 1990, the US Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Science,
Space, and technology requested an assessment of space debris
concerning both its hazards and strategies to deal with it. The
final product, drawing on the 1989 Report on Orbital Debris,
concluded with eleven findings summarizing the current conditions
surrounding the space debris issue. First, if space users fail
to act soon to reduce their contribution to debris, orbital debris
could severely restrict the use of some orbits within a decade or
two. Second, the lack of adequate data on the orbital distribution
and size of debris will continue to hamper efforts to reduce the
threat that debris poses to spacecraft. Third, the development
of additional debris mitigation techniques could sharply reduce the
growth of orbital debris. Fourth, although it is technically
feasible to remove existing debris from low altitudes, the cost
of removal is not warranted at this time. Fifth, protection
technologies could reduce the harm that debris can do. Sixth,
the presence of debris in low-Earth orbits, where fast moving objects
could pierce inhabited spacecraft such as the planned international
space station, Freedom, and the Soviet space station, Mir, is
especially troublesome because of the risk to human life.
Seventh, addressing the orbital debris problem will require the
active involvement of all space-capable nations. Eighth, existing
international treaties and agreements are inadequate for minimizing
the generation of orbital debris or controlling its effects. An
international treaty or agreement specifically devoted to orbital
debris may be necessary. Ninth, for an international legal
regime on orbital debris to be established, several legal issues,
including the definition of orbital debris, jurisdiction and
control over orbital debris, and the treatment of liability for
damage from orbital debris, need to be resolved. Tenth,
private-sector space activities have already benefited form
orbital debris research carried out by governments. As private space
activities increase, firms will have to bear their share of the
burden of mitigating future contributions to the orbital debris
population. Lastly, many misconceptions about orbital debris
exist. An international educational program about orbital debris
would assist in making the hazards of space debris better
understood. It would seem that scientists and governments are
finally beginning to converge on the need to deal with the
substantive issues confronting space debris. However, how or
when this convergence will result in substantive action remains to be
seen.
3. Related Cases:
Keyword Clusters
(1): Forum = CITES
(2): Bio-geography = TEMPerate [TEMP]
(3): Environmental Problem = Species Loss Land [SPLL]
4. Draft Author: James Bonnell and Damon C. Morris
B. LEGAL Clusters
5. Discourse and Status: NA and INPROG
The problem of orbital debris is not a case that is likely
to involve legal procedures, although a treaty on the subject is a
possibility at some time in the future. It is more likely that
governments will agree to limit usage of space to satellites,
mostly reusable launch vehicles (like Shuttle -- as opposed to
complete disposables that can leave debris such as Ariane or
Atlas) and permanent outposts (like the Space Station or Mir) which
are less likely to leave debris in orbit. However, since this
problem does affect all spacefaring nations, an informal agreement is
likely in the next ten years.
Despite several international treaties including The Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, The Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968,
The Liability Convention of 1972, The Registration Convention of
1976, and The Moon Agreement of 1979, no international law exists to
deal specifically with space debris. Attempts to apply the
aforementioned treaties have experienced significant legal problems.
6. Forum and Scope: MANY and MULTIlateral
National legislatures, which directly control the budgets of
space agencies (such as in the US, Japan, Russia, and China) or
jointly control (the European Space Agency), are technically the
relevant forum. It is slightly more complicated than that, since
the agencies (mostly) request budgets that will take into account
the additional costs associated with protecting satellites and
stations from orbiting debris. It is unilateral in the sense
that at this time each agency/government pair is taking action in a
different way, to the degree that they are taking any action at
all. However, there is an international committee discussing the
problem, which Japan, Russia, the US, and the European Space
Agency all belong to, and China, Brazil, India, and Israel will be
invited to join. If such a committee comes to a binding worldwide
agreement, it will be a MULTIlateral issue.
7. Decision Breadth: approximately 15-20
Today, only currently spacefaring nations have to be worried
about orbital debris. However, with the exception of satellites
that fall out of orbit or are removed from orbit, virtually
everything currently orbiting the Earth will still be there for
decades, if not hundreds of years. Therefore, any nation that
wishes to utilize the worthwhile orbits in the future (low earth,
geosynchronous) will also need to deal with debris (and other
space environmental hazards: micrometeorites, magnetic fields, cosmic
radiation). Nations which possess launch vehicles are the United
States, Russia, the Ukraine, Japan, China, India, Israel, Brazil,
Australia, and the 13 European members of the European Space
Agency. More nations may develop launch technologies in the
future (especially in the longer term of 50+ years); current nations
may lose interest or let their launch capability decay (through lack
of desire or lack of money, such as Russia).
8. Legal Standing: SUBLAW
The funding may come from governments, but it is the
national space agencies that actually make decisions on what to do.
For example, it is up to NASA to make the relevant modifications to
the Space Station to protect the humans, experiments, and Station
itself. Governments, however, could conceivably pass legislation
to require that all launch vehicles/satellites are "orbit
degradable" (so to speak)... that would definitely leave orbit
after use. And there is potential for international agreement on
the subject; after all, it will affect all those currently in
space and those who wish to be in space in the future.
C. GEOGRAPHIC Clusters
9. Geographic Locations
a. Geographic Domain: SPACE
b. Geographic Site: EARTH ORBIT
c. Geographic Impact: GLOBAL
10. Sub-National Factors: NO
11. Type of Habitat: NA
D. TRADE Clusters
12. Type of Measure: REGSTD
To the degree that it is anything, this 'case' would likely
involve regulatory standards on satellite design, vehicle design,
and Space Stations (i.e. the space agencies would not want to
lose their investment to a piece of errant satellite...or to lose
people ever.) Currently, there are no relevant treaties that
specifically deal with orbital debris.
There is no transnational space regime. However, since most
space activity is the result of government funded research, space
programs are regulated and administered by individual states.
Article VI of the Space Treaty states that State Parties to the
Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that
national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions
set forth in the present Treaty.
13. Direct vs Indirect Impacts: INDirect
The actual trade effect could be direct with the
introduction of thousands of new satellites (almost literally...
there are a number of proposed large systems such as Iridium with 66
low earth orbit satellites, or Bill Gates' Teledesic with 840
proposed satellites !). Iridium, which recently received FCC
approval, would be a cellular phone system, with 66 satellites in low
earth orbit, able to communicate with any point on Earth. They have
not yet filed launch plans, however. Teledesic would be meant to
replace terestrial telephone networks, but it is barely an idea
at this point. Otherwise, debris could indirectly affect trade in
the aerospace industry. Regardless of debris' effect on current or
future satellites in orbit, demand for deployment of new systems
is not likely to be substantially impacted for a number of years.
14. Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact
a. Directly Related: YES SATELLite
b. Indirectly Related: NO
c. Not Related: NO
d. Related to Process: YES
15. Trade Product Identification: SATELLites
16. Economic Data
Space budgets for government agencies: NASA $14 billion; US
DOD $15 billion; European Space Agency $5 billion; Japan's NASDA
$2 billion. Worldwide revenues from satellite operations: $5
billion/yearly. Ground equipment sales: $5 billion/yearly.
17. Impact of Measure on Trade Competitiveness: MEDium
As stated by the US Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, space debris has not yet reached the critical point.
Despite continuously increasing amounts of debris, the launch rate
has remained fairly constant since 1965.
Price Effect: % impossible to estimate, but it will add to
the price of any system, especially the Station (safety costs lots of
money). Competitive Effect: LOW (any nation which has space
launch capability will tend to deny that technology to other
nations; c.f. ballistic missile treaties). This is only a
problem if the nation which can reach space does not allow others to
use space. The US is a founding member of Intelsat (for example),
which gives satellite capacity to member nations for television
and telephone calls in return for operating and launch expenses. The
competitive effect will be felt by countries that fail to take
debris dangers into account when designing satellites and launch
vehicles; also, countries that have more satellites in space
and/or conduct more space launches will be more effected than those
that have less.
18. Industry Sector: FABMET
Most space-related objects tend to be metallic, but they
also tend to have complicated electronics and other technologies
(like rocket engines) that are combinations of many things.
19. Exporters and Importers: United States and undefined
Almost no one exports or imports components for launch
vehicles, as these technologies are not only critical for space
operations, but may also be used, for example, for ballistic
missiles (and therefore tend to fall under the Ballistic Missile
Control Regime, and are not for export or import from states that
do not themselves develop the technology). However, satellite
technology and products become a bit more complicated to
catalogue.
The United States is the largest exporter of telecommunications
'products', primarily television through comsats and telephone
time through comsats (cable being Earth-based, and thus irrelevant to
this case). The U.S. is the biggest importer of
telecommunications 'product' (telephone, television). Concerning
satellites, the U.S. has the largest commercial sales of finished
satellites, but importation of finished satellites is fairly
diffused. The largest importer of finished satellites is
Intelsat; but of course, Intelsat is an international organization,
not a country.
Major space-faring entities include Russia, the United
States, France, the United Kingdom, the Peoples Republic of China,
Japan, India, and the European Space Agency. Every state benefits in
some way from information gathered in space. For instance, The NOAA
satellites provide weather information to over 120 countries.
E. ENVIRONMENT Clusters
20. Environmental Problem Type: Resource use, higher costs
of future orbital devices.
21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species: N/A
22. Impact and Effect: LOW and STRCT
Low (there are still many, many orbital slots...it's just
that there are small things in orbit and outside of orbit that might
collide with future satellites.
23. Urgency and Lifetime: NA
Retrieving space debris is technologically feasible.
However, the costs involved in such a mission are regarded as
unwarranted. Designing spacecraft that return to earth after being
spent and that shed less debris during the lifespan of the craft are
other possible alternatives to current approaches to space
exploration.
24. Substitutes: LIKE
There are no substitutes for programs like the Space
Station, but for communications purposes using Earth-based
communications methods like seabed fiber optic cables might be an
option if there were ever to be a significant concern about the
crowding of orbits.
F. OTHER Factors
25. Culture NO
26. Trans-Border: YES
Orbiting satellites pass over any number of countries,
depending upon their particular orbit and height above the earth
(for example, satellites in Geosynchronous orbit above the
equator stay over one spot). In addition, use of orbital space is
limited to those who can pay for the capacity to get there and have a
use for it; fortunately, for example, Intelsat allows countries which
could otherwise not afford to put up a satellite to use satellites.
27. Rights: NO
28. Relevant Literature
Asker, James R. "Space Station Designers Intensify Effort to
Counter Orbital Debris" in Aviation Week and Space
Technology. June 8, 1992, 68-69.
Baker, Howard A. Space Debris: Legal and Policy Implications.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1989.
Barton, Kathy. Space Fills Up With Junk. Environment 27.
1985. 24.
Broad, William J. "Space station faces danger from flotsam" in
New York Times. Jun 27 1994 A 1:2.
Cowen, Robert C. "Clean Up Space Junk for Safety's Sake" in
Christian Science Monitor. Jun 17, 1992 15:2.
Euroconsult. World Space Markets: 10 Year Outlook. 1994.
European Space Agency. Space Debris. (Paris: European Space
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