Introduction:

     The Middle East is one of the most arid and water scarce regions in the world where the history of water related conflicts extends back 5000 years.  Control, use, share, and management of water produces great tensions and underlies various type of conflicts between sovereign states and peoples of the region.  Despite the size of the Middle East, there are only three rivers that can be classified as large by world standards: the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris rivers.   These rivers provide relatively extensive water resources for the region.  Except in Turkey and a few mountainous areas, rainfall is generally inadequate and is unable to support regular water needs and agriculture without irrigation.

     The flow of major Middle Eastern rivers such as Nile and the Euphrates comes to a large extent from rain and snow that falls outside the region.  The geopolitical importance of the region, as well as ethnic and religious controversy, aggravates the usual problems of sharing natural resources such as oil and water in many different settings.  One of the new agenda items of security studies, environmental security, particularly natural resources conflicts gives serious attention to water disputes.  According to these various studies, there are major reasons that make water likely to be a source of military or political action, such as, the degree of water scarcity, the extent to which the supply is shared by two or more groups, the relative power of those groups, and the ease of access to alternative fresh water resources. (1)  In the Middle East region, besides these general reasons, we can categorize several other factors that create particular obstacles:
 

       1.     Transboundary character: Every major river in the region crosses one or more international border and fifty percent of the population in the region depend on water flowing from another sovereign States.²   Political borders of sovereign states exert major influence on individual policies on water and in general, often lead to  impractical and unpredictable water management systems, which poses a serious  threat to security of the people.

2.      Geography and climate: The Middle East is the most arid region in the world. Moreover, the rivers of the region possess a volatile character.  The net result of these conditions are that the management of such rivers is extremely difficult even if they were to be confined within the borders of a single nation.  This is particularly true when the history of land use along the rives is taken into account, In almost every case, these rivers and their flood plains have been the last to be developed, and is generally used for hydroelectric generation as well as agriculture. This geographical setting contributes to tension between upstream and downstream countries.
 

 3.  Population, environment, and economy: Increasing population, poverty, and inefficient use of water accentuates the existing problem of water. The level of economic development, increasing pressure from population growth, irresponsible patterns of urbanization and industrialization, lack of environmentally sensitive technology adversely affects the quality and quantity of available water. The main disputes in the region are over the use of fresh water as a resource for consumption, whether in relation to agricultural, domestic or industrial activity. Transboundary  pollution will become a part of this picture soon, if it does not already exist. Navigation and fisheries disputes are minor issues in the region at this point.

4.    Political uncertainty: The region is a politically turbulent area of the world. The various societies in the region were greatly affected by the two world wars. During the last 50 years, the region has been the scene of half-a-dozen substantial outbreaks of armed conflict, two of which involved  intervention by forces from outside the region. None of these conflicts was directly about the control of water resources. Nevertheless, the character of these disputes have made it difficult for governments to co-operate over water. There is a severe lack of confidence among the states, and their leaders. there is no regional institution that is capable of  bringing together countries over the economic and political issues. The only organization, the Arab League, does not include Ethiopia, Turkey, and of course, Israel. Even among the members of the Arab League there are significant differences over a series of regional problems and issues. It is very hard to predict the future of region given the fast and dramatic changes over the past three decades. The region's most important natural resource, oil reserves, was an immense attraction for Western countries, especially during the late 19th and 20th century. Outside powers have been playing an important role in the past, and this will be the case in the future.
 
5.    Uncertain Databases:  The last obstacle to establish a policy in the region is a lack of reliable and agreed information about the overall inventory of water resources. The vital statistics of Middle Eastern rivers and aquifers are often incomplete  and unreliable. There are several reasons for the  uncertainty. First, the water resources have not been fully studied over a sufficiently long period for reliable results. Second, Figures for the same watercourse may vary because different 'runs'  of the year have been used to establish an average. Third, data may be presented in different ways for a variety of political reasons. For example,  while an upstream state may wish to show a higher figure for the river's average flow to show that there is  ample water in a shared river to enable a proposed project and to satisfy the needs of downstream states. A downstream state may , however, demonstrate that the average flow was likely to be much lower if the project goes ahead and thus deprive it of the water it needs. The difficulty of obtaining precise agreed data hinders scientific work on rivers and aquifers in the region. (3)

        The longest inter-state river, the Euphrates, has been developed since 4000 BC. Several ancient civilizations in Mesopotamia were supported by irrigation from the Tigris and Euphrates river basin. Thousands of years ago, water from these two great rivers helped to create the "fertile crescent" giving rise to the first civilization of the Middle East.  Forty-five hundred years ago, the control of irrigation canals vital to survival became the source of conflict between the states of  Umma and Lagash in the Ancient Middle East.(5) Having an extremely arid climate, however, the farm lands on the Mesopotamian alluvial have suffered from salt accumulation and water logging problems since 2400 BC, the Sumerian age.(6). Throughout history, this ancient civilization disappeared and many others were devastated by the abandonment of irrigation systems. Twenty seven  hundred years ago, Assurbanipal, king of Assyra from 669 to 626, seized control of wells in the course of waging strategic warfare against Arabia. Over the course of human history different factors have come together many times to produce a wide range of disputes over access to shared freshwater resources in Mesopotamia.
 
       The Mesopotamian waters, the Euphrates and the Tigris, rise in the Mountains of eastern Turkey; the Euphrates flows through Syria to Iraq before emptying into Persian/Arab Gulf. The Tigris flows to Iraq and joins  with the Euphrates in Iraq before reaching  the Persian/Arab Gulf to Shatt-al Arab. Until the end of World War I, these rivers were under the control of Ottoman Empire, and little international importance was attached to the river basin.

            A. THE EUPHRATES RIVER
            The Euphrates River consists of two main  tributaries, the Karasu and Murat rivers, both originating in Eastern
            rain that falls in Turkey, and only 11.3% from rainfall in Syria.(7) During its passage through Syria (657 km) and Iraq
            (around 1,200 km), the Euphrates receives only negligible amount of water. Euphrates has only one third the
            volume of the Nile River with average flow of 32.5 bcm2, but it is the longest river in East Asia ( 2,700 km).
            Although the longer of the two, the Euphrates is smaller than the Tigris in volume.
            Table 1 the three  riparian countries contribution and demands respectively.

        B. THE TIGRIS RIVER:
    The Tigris river, originating from  Lake Hazer became the border between Turkey and Syria for distance of 40 km., and
         border between Turkey and Iraq ( 7km), as it  flows into Iraq. So, the Tigris is divided only Between Turkey and Iraq. Its
        main  tributaries are Botan, Batmansu, Karpansu and  the Greater Zap rivers emerging from Turkey, the lesser Zap, and
        Diyala emerging from Iran, and finally Uzayam whose source is in Iraq's northern mountains. The Tigris receives virtually
        50% of the water in Iraq, the tributaries, which join the Tigris in Iraq, add a significant amount of water to the Tigris below
        Baghdad. As a result, Iraq's supply of water from the Tigris is much less vulnerable to developments upstream than is its
        supply from the Euphrates. Iraq also has an opportunity to obtain water from Tigris. Iraq has the physical means to do so,
        having constructed canals linking the two rivers. However, like the Euphrates, the volume of the Tigris also varies greatly
        from year to year, and season to season. This may limit Iraq's opportunities for substituting water from the Tigris for that of
        the Euphrates, ot vice-versa, when the flow in one river is low. (8) table 2 indicates water potential of the Tigris River
        basin and consumption targets of the riparian countries.

    The Euphrates and Tigris rivers posses a distinctive character. They receive all their waters near their sources and grow, and they become smaller as they flow to the sea. They have extremely high seasonal and multi annual variances in their flow (between 10.7 bcm.-63.4 bcm.). Seasonal changes are also remarkable in terms of the volume of water. The river's peak flow is in spring and early summer, and it is almost eight times bigger than the low period from July to October.⁽⁹⁾

  1. Until 1970: The use of these rivers by three respective countries has been the subject of diplomacy and commentary ever since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent disruption of the political unity that had previously inhibited the conflict with respect to the Euphrates Tigris Rivers Basin. However, until 1970's, there was no significant complaint or conflict. Iraq, as a downstream country, was the earlier developer and user of these waters flowing between the riparian  countries. Turkey and Syria, as upstream countries, were not active in using the water in the Euphrates and the Tigris river basin. In Iraq, large-scale irrigation did begin late in the 19th century, when a number of the ancient irrigation canals were cleaned and opened again for use. In the years just before  World War I, while Iraq was still a part of the Ottoman Empire, a dam was constructed on the Euphrates in Hindiya, to divert water for irrigation.  Later Iraq sought to control the two rivers at the other end as well. Dams were also built on the Tigris to produce hydropower, and a barrage as constructed on the Euphrates at Ramadi to protect areas further downstream from flooding. (10)
        The diplomatic effort to specify respective legal rights was contained in three international legal documents. First, the 1921 Ankara Treaty with France that formalized the Turkish-Syrian border, second the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, that established new State of Turkey, and third the 1946 Friendship and Good Neighbor Treaty with Iraq. (11) These agreements well worked as long as the waters were being used  at a minimal level. The real problem emerged when the midstream and upstream countries, Syria and Turkey respectively, initiated projects for developing the waters of the Euphrates in the 1960s'. Turkey decided to build the Keban Dam on the Euphrates River, and made arrangements for financing  based on conditions  that the World Bank has imposed on similar projects. According to the terms of the agreement. (12), Turkey would try to make the necessary arrangements with Syria and Iraq with regard to an initial filling of a reservoir.

2. First Crises: In 1968, Syria started to build the Tabaqa (later renamed al-Thawara) dam on the Euphrates with Soviet assistance. Iraq, too, had undertake the Gharraf Project between the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Al-Thawara and Keban dams were both completed in the period between 1973-1975, when particularly dry seasons ahd been experienced, making the operation of both dams generative of a crisis. Iraq accused Syria of reducing the river's flow to intolerable levels, while Syria transferred blame to Turkey. The water shortage brought Iraq and Syria to the brink of armed hostility.(13)  In 1974, Iraq threatened to bomb the al-Thawra dam in Syria, Iraq massed troops along the  Syrian border, alleging that dam had reduced the flow of water to Iraq. A water war was averted through the frantic efforts of Saudi Arabia, which mediated the dispute, urging Syria to release additional amounts of water so as to increase the flow into Iraq. According to the agreement, that was not made public, Syria will keep 40% of water and will allow 60% to pass through to Iraq.
        One year after the crisis, Turkey laid the foundations of the Karakaya Dam and an accompanying hydroelectric power plant, further downstream  from Keban. This was a second major step in the development of water resources, as financed by the world bank. Turkey unilaterally guaranteed a minimum flow if 500 cum/s to downstream countries. The Karakaya Dam entered service in 1987, while work on the Ataturk Dam had been under way since 1983. During these years, Syria was studying the feasibility of another major project upstream from al-Thawra, the Tishrin Dam. Thus, successive water development projects upstream became nightmares for downstream states throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

3. Southern Anatolia Project (GAP):
Meanwhile, since 1970's all these dam projects like Karayaka, Ataturk, and many others were built and became parts of the big integrated development project initiated by Turkey in upper Mesopotamia, Southern Anatolia Region. The target if this ambitious project, so called GAP (Southern Anatolia Region), one of the largest of its kind in the world, was to increase hydroelectric production and to irrigate an additional two million hectares of land by early in the next century. The Keban and the Karakaya were designed solely for hydroelectric power generation, but the centerpiece of GAP, the Ataturk Dam and hydroelectric power plant, also included a major irrigation scheme, with a secondary network planned to follow in due course. Thus, for the first time, Turkey was engaged  in consumptive use of waters, and was doing so in huge quantities. Turkey proved that it could carry to the project far along while relying solely on its domestic resources. It did so without making any further concessions to downstream  neighbors in return for conditional loans.(14) This $32 billion project, GAP, will on completion consist of 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants, and an irrigation network for 1.7 million hectares of land schemes of various scales in 13 different locations.(15) Table 3 represents the aggregate impacts of projects going forward in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers:
 
 

PROJECT AREA	INSTALLED CAPACITY	ENERGY PRODUCED	IRRIGATED LAND	PLANNED WORK
EUPHRATES	5304 MW	20 billion kWh	1million Ha.	7 Projects   14 dams 11HPW
TIGRIS	2172 MW	7 billion kWh	700.000 ha.	6 projects     8 dams   8 HPW
TOTAL	7476 MW	27 billion kWh	1.700.000 ha.	13 Projects   22 dams   19 HPW

 
The GAP project covers an area of 75.000 square kilometers in southeast Turkey, 9.5% of the national land area. Approximately 6 million people live in the region, 9.1% of the Turkey's population. Tigris and Euphrates Rivers represent over 28% of the national surface water supply, and the total economically irrigable area in the Project Region accounts for over 20% of what available for the entire country. This area is equal to 26 percent of Iraq, 42 percent of Syria, 1.1 times the size of Israel and 1.25 times that of Jordan. When completed, the project will achieve the full development of over 1.7 million hectares of land through irrigation. The ratio of irrigated land to the total GAP area will increase from a current 2.9% to 22.8%, while that for rain-fed agriculture will decrease from a 34.3% to 10.7%. 27 billion kWh of hydroelectric energy will be generated annually with an installed capacity of 7500 MW. When GAP is fully implemented, it is expected that the national average of energy use will more than double.

    The undertaking, which was originally planned as a water resources development package was later transformed into an integrated, multi-sectoral, regional development program. According to Turkish authorities, GAP, is a regional development project carried out with the primary purpose of promoting human well-being. It aims at the comprehensive development of a whole region, and offers a significant model to the world. The project is socially essential as it is intended to improve significantly the living standards and quality of life of the local people, increase their per capita income, create new employment opportunities, and protect the environment. Also it is economically viable as it will radically change the economic structure, increase agricultural production and more than quadruple the GNP. As a direct result of the GAP investments, the living standards of many inhabitants has already started to increase. The population is expected to increase from six million in 1998 to 9 million by 2005, with 66% of the total living in urban centers. Urbanization in the region has received a boost, and rural migration should slow down considerably.
 

4. The Second Crisis: Syria and Iraq fear that Turkey's use of the Euphrates waters will disrupt both their current consumption patterns and future development plans. The GAP project created anxiety among its downstream neighbors even before starting to have any kind of adverse effect. After the first crisis between Syria and Iraq in 1990, when Turkey finished construction of the Ataturk Dam, the largest of the twenty-two dams proposed for the Grand Anatolia Project, and interrupted the flow of the Euphrates for a month partly to fill the reservoir, the second crisis occurred. Despite an advanced warning from Turkey, as well as being given more water before and after temporary cutoff of river waters, created high tension over the downstream. Syria and Iraq both protested that Turkey now possessed a water weapon that could be used against them. For one month Turkey held back the main flow of the Euphrates River, which cut the downstream flow in Syria to about a quarter of its normal rate. Syria is already desperately short of water, and much of the water for its towns, industries, and farms comes from the Euphrates. Beyond this dependence, the country has been chronically vulnerable to drought. Furthermore, Syria's population growth rate, at 3.7 percent per year, is one of the highest in the world, constantly adding to the scale of Syria's demand for water. Turkey and Syria have exchanged angry threats arising from this situation. Syria has been giving sanctuary to guerilla separatists of the Kurdish Workers Party (the PKK), a movement that has been waging a war of insurgency against the Turkish government in eastern Anatolia.

5. Diplomatic Attempts:    Meanwhile, diplomatic meetings have been taking place among the three countries. In 1980, the Turkish-Iraqi Mixed Economic Commission agreed upon the formation of a joint Technical Committee (JTC), to study matters relating to regional waters, in particular the Euphrates and Tigris rivers basin. In 1983, Syria joined the meetings and from then on the JTC convened its sessions on a trilateral basis. But after sixteen technical and two ministerial meetings, the JTC talks reached a deadlock, having failed even to produce an outline that might serve as a basis for a report. However, bilateral talks continued and further initiatives were put forward. In 1987, two protocols were signed simultaneously between Syria and Turkey in Damascus. The first was an agreement on economic cooperation, Article 6 of which contained commitment by Turkey to release minimum annual average of 500 cum/s from the Euphrates waters "until the ultimate allocation" of the river's waters between the three countries could be agreed upon. The second protocol was an agreement on security cooperation. The contents of the protocol were an outgrowth of Turkey's pressure on Syria to end its support for PKK operations. Syria was allegedly using the PKK as a way to induce Turkey to release additional waters. As a result, it seemed natural to assume that the political and resource controversies were inescapably connected to each other. At every opportunity, Turkey unequivocally declared that it would not use transboundary waters for political purposes, whereas Syria denied any connection between its relations to the PKK and water issues. Nevertheless, in October 1989, late Prime Minister Turgut Ozal indicated that Turkey might impound the river's water if Syria failed to restrain the PKK from operating within its territory. Although Ozal later withdrew this threat, the underlying tensions have not been resolved, and there are currently no significant high-level talks on water sharing. The most recent negotiations concerning the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers basin was held on three occasions, first two with Syria, and the last one with Iraq bilaterally, in 1993.

6. Political Obstacles between Syria, Iraq and Turkey: The issue of Euphrates water is also entwined with concerns about territorial integrity and relations with ethnic minorities within these countries. Consequently, although water scarcity is a source of serious tension between Syria and Turkey, and may trigger interstate violence in the future, the dispute is not a pure example of a simple-scarcity conflict. Syrian officials argue that Turkey has already used its power over the headwaters of the Euphrates for political goals and could do so again. On its part, Turkey is blaming Syria for lending support to the PKK against Turkey's national security and unity.

    The ability of Turkey to shut off the flow of the Euphrates, even temporarily, was noted by political and military strategists at the beginning of the Gulf conflict. In the early days of the conflict during the crisis preceding the war, there were behind-the-scenes discussions at the United Nations about using Turkish dams on the Euphrates River to deprive Iraq of a significant fraction of its fresh water supply in response to its invasion of Kuwait. While no such action was ever taken, the threat of the "water weapon" was again a part of the diplomatic setting. Turkey has never yet used water as means of political pressure and it declined to do so during the Gulf War.
 
    According to some interpretations, there is a link between the Middle East Peace agreement and the tension between Syria and Turkey with regard to the Euphrates River. If Syria is obliged to give up water resources on Golan, and then it will be more than ever dependent on water from the Euphrates, and might reasonably claim additional amounts. This way of thinking creates more conflict than cooperation. In terms of hydrology, it is difficult, and also not feasible, to establish a comprehensive and sustainable water management system than is larger than the river basin principle.
 

7. Peace Pipeline Projects: Turkey's late president Turgut Ozal championed the concept of a "peace pipeline" that would transport water from two western Turkish rivers, the Seyhan and Ceyhan, southward to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf States. A Canadian company has been trying to market a highly imaginative project: the transfer of as much as 250mcm of water from Turkey to Israel in enormous containers - referred to as "Medusa bags" - that would be floated across the Mediterranean. At the same time the "Peace Pipeline" project has been trumpeted by the Turkish government as one of the best hopes for lasting peace in the Middle East region because if fully implemented, it could effectively end regional states' competition and anxiety over this scarce. The project, however, has not been so warmly received by several states in the region, partly because of its high estimated cost of $21 billion -- a figure believed by some to be "grossly underestimated," and of the length of time (ten years) projected as needed for the operation of the pipeline. However, the most important concern is that the pipeline, as currently conceived, would pass through a number of downstream countries that do not trust each other (e.g. Israel / Jordan; Israel / Syria). Moreover, the downstream Arab states especially the oil-rich ones would be reluctant to grant any further advantage to the militarily, politically and hydrologically stronger upstream state of the "Ottoman / Turks".

8. Recent Situation: In 1995, a new storm over water supplies has broken out as a result of the finalization of a credit agreement for the new Birecik Dam on the Euphrates River. The dispute has led Syria to start lobbying against Turkey, not only in the Arab League, but also in Western countries. The latest broadside in the bitter war of words over Middle East water resources has come from an unlikely cross-border alliance: Two states that have had no diplomatic relations for 15 years, Syria and Iraq. These are governments in which their respective leaders hold each other in mutual contempt and the enemy of one is a close ally of the other. Nevertheless, as is not so unusual in international relations, they have somehow managed a common stand. Syria and Iraq agree absolutely only on one thing -- the threat to their future that is being posed by Turkish action to harness the resources of the Tigris and the Euphrates under the predominant control of Ankara. Despite their deep political cleavages with each other, officials from both states, along with other Arab countries, endorsed a Damascus Declaration accusing Turkey of releasing contaminated water downstream to Syria. Ankara, responded by dismissing the attacks as "a storm in a teacup", insisting that Syrian claims of polluted water flowing downstream to Syria along the Euphrates, "were not taken seriously  by experts". According to Turkish experts, the Birecik Dam is a dam built according to international standards. It aims to monitor the flow of water from the Ataturk Dam with the objective of providing a more regular supply of water to downstream countries. At present, GAP is irrigating less than one tenth of the area that it plans eventually irrigate. The Turkish side has also denied that Syria was uninformed on the construction of Birecik Dam, saying that technical information has been regularly provided to Syria since 1983.

    As the positions of the three countries have remained essentially unchanged for years, the Turkish press assumes that the latest diplomatic fuss over the water is linked to the latest round of peace talks between Israel and Syria. The former Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, had proposed that Syria obtain water from Turkey, thereby allowing Israel to keep all the water sources that are currently under its authority today. Ankara insists categorically that the waters of the Euphrates have nothing to do with the Middle East peace process. Indeed, the 1996 agreement between Turkey and Israel represents one further aspect of the search for a new balance in the region against other neighboring countries. As this controversy continues to unfold, it is evident that access to water is a crucial element in any viable system of comprehensive security for the region.

    In September 1998, the latest crisis between Syria and Turkey was the most serious one to date. Turkish leaders have adopted a new, harsh tone with Syria. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz accused Syria of being "the headquarters of terrorism in the Middle East" and reportedly warned Damascus that the Turkish Army is on standby, "awaiting orders' to attack. Ten thousand Turkish troops were moved to the Syrian border and have been prohibited from taking leave. The Turkish air force was put on red alert, and remains so at this time. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek has spent the week of shuttling between Ankara and Damascus. Finally, the agreement reached between Syria and Turkey. Unlike previous talks between the two countries, omits the water issue from the commitments undertaking. This tendency indicates that Turkey is clearly differentiating these two issues as a matter of diplomacy, and seems successful at this point.

IV. Institutional and Legal Responses

    There is a large and  growing literature warning of future "water wars" - they point to water not only as a cause of historic armed conflict, but the resource which will bring combatants to the battlefield in the 21st  century. (29) Water disputes in the near past have more often produce political friction rather than violent conflict and this, fortunately, encourages parties to have recourse to international negotiations and means of cooperation rather than to embark precipitously upon military action. (30)  Over 3,600 treaties have been signed historically over different aspects of international waters, 145 in this century. (31)  There are a number of legal institutional means available to help reduce the risk of water related conflicts and to provide fair and reasonable international management of rivers and other transboundary water resources.  The influential NGO of international lawyers, International Law Association [ILA] (32), and the United Nations institution International Law Commission [ILC](33) have been working for three decades on this issue, seeking to develop a treaty structure for the non navigational uses of international watercourses. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Law of Non navigational Uses of International Watercourses based on general  principles of various draft articles prepared by the ILA and the ILC, on May 21, 1997. (34)   The convention is divided into seven parts  containing thirty-seven articles : Introduction; General Principles, Planned Measures; protection; Preservation and Management; Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations; Miscellaneous Provisions; and Final Clauses. AN annex sets forth procedures to be used in the event the parties to a dispute agree to submit to arbitration. During the negotiation period, some  parts of the Convention created conflicted, and lead to heated arguments among representatives of the negotiating states. The vote was 103 in favor, 27 abstentions and 3 against ( Burundi, China and Turkey). The Convention will enter into force after 35 ratifications. This level of ratification will probably not be achieved easily.  Many states already have treaties  governing their international watercourses with which they are satisfied , and may perceived only little to gain in this Convention.  Others may believe they are better off not being a party because the treaty framework may adversely affect their position on on-going dispute. Some others are island states or otherwise lack international watercourses and therefore may have little or no interest in becoming a party.(35)
    International rivers, lakes and aquifers are a unique type of natural resources. Unlike territorial resources controlled by  single state, they are frequently  not fully subject to national appropriation, and yet such resources are not an aspect of the global commons to which all states enjoy potentially unrestricted access, like the high seas, the mineral resources of the deep seabed, and outer space. Aside from their navigational uses, freshwater resources that traverse political boundaries are a collective good to which only riparian states enjoy rights of use and access. Even though non riparian states are excluded from using such water resources, riparian states will need to regulate their respective rights and obligations with one another.
    International environmental law, a relatively new branch of international law, despite its fast and comprehensive recent development, is not effective in promoting environmental security as broadly conceived. Traditional international law remains focused principally on the territorial interests of states, giving relatively little attention to efforts  to accommodate the widening range of ecological interests and needs. The first important principle of international  environmental law is "territorial sovereignty" and an unrestricted right to use  natural resources as qualified by an obligation not to cause significant harm to the environment of other states. (36)  This principle has found application in the context of transboundary freshwater pollution, and has found expression in the series of multilateral freshwater agreements.(37)  A second cornerstone of international environmental law is the obligation of riparian nations  to share equitably the beneficial uses of transboundary  freshwater resources. (38)  Considering customary international environmental law principles, as ensuring equitable use and prevention of  transboundary harm, states in these settings are subject to rules governing prior notification, sharing information, joint consultation, and duty to seek negotiation. However, these principles do not effectively address environmental security concerns. First given their focus on territorial interests and uses rather than environmental needs, the rules cannot ensure ecological balance. Second, such principles are ultimately incapable of preventing conflict over degraded resources . Third, because of the division of water resources into territorial segments and the focus on competing state interest,  customary law is inherently confrontational and does little to promote cooperation on behalf of the common environmental interests of all states. (39)
    Interpretations of rights can be more beneficial if we define water resources management as "the art  of matching supply of water demands while controlling quality." In other words, eater quality and quantity issues are complementary with each other. It is by now accepted that water resource development projects create some environmental problems. The goal of "no damage to nature" while developing water resources is not realistic. However, intelligent planning, sustainable economic development, and environmental management can be concordantly pursued to minimize negative effects.
    The complexity of the relations between the two legal principles of " reasonable and equitable utilization" of transboundary water courses and "not causing appreciable harm" to neighbors should be acknowledged, and reconciled to the extend possible by means of well mediated technical approaches.  The framework convention of the United States on Transboundary waters (1997) posits a compromise between these two principles in order to  balance the rights od downstream and upstream parties.  While downstream countries are naturally in favor of "not causing appreciable (or significant) harm principle", the "equitable utilization principle" is favorable for the upstream states.
 
 V. CONCLUSION

    The hydropolitics of  the Euphrates and Tigris dates back to at least 1920's, and will be on the agenda of future relations irrespective of whether a solution is found for the political and ethnic problems of the region.  The greatest obstacle arises from the differences in the approach taken by Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Iraq and Syria insist that an agreement on the water issues is necessary, while Turkey, on the contrary, is favorably disposed toward international negotiations on the sharing of the water between the  three countries. Iraq claims "historical rights" over the rivers, and presupposes that legal regimes for the two rivers,  should be addressed separately . However, Turkey considers that  the two rivers are part of a single water basin, and insists on an "integrated river basin management system" in the region that covers both the Euphrates and the Tigris. The integrated approach is also defined and accepted by the new framework convention adopted under the UN auspices.
    Turkey supports a three stage plan to be realized through the cooperation of the three parties, which basically proposes the distribution of water according to the needs of each country, and technological cooperation between the parties to promote rational use.  This plan presupposes a long-term convergence of interests  in the region, but the short term tensions are producing a series of crises due to the distrust and disagreement among these countries. To identify the reasonable and appropriate amount of water each country needs  from both rivers depends upon the use of complete and accurate information on land water resources of the Euphrates / Tigris basin.  It should be noted that in many countries  institutional mechanisms to merge available  water supplies with competing  demands  are absent or are very weak.  Collecting data on water is not an easy task anywhere, but especially not in the Middle  East, where information on available resources can operate as a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations. The establishment of a joint  data bank could help build the trust and reliable information that will be required to move the affected governments towards a comprehensive agreement  or to resolve disputes as they arise in the meantime. (40)
    The three riparian countries, during the past two decades, have engaged in aggressive political attacks upon each other. For instance, one of the Turkish officials, has responded against Syria in strong language that  "we will dry them up" or "they need additional water to wash the blood of terrorism from their hands." (41)  Syria, on its ride, has not hesitated to use PKK and to give support to the Kurdish movement in Turkey. It has not done this for the sake of humanitarian reasons, but only to show the  Turkish state that it possess a negotiation chip so as to get more water from Turkey. However, it is inconceivable that  given  the actual or potential ethnic turmoil and separatism in the region that the problems with Turkey, Syria and Iraq would simply disappear if water disputes were treated separately, and solved. That is, the water dimension has become implicated in the ethnic conflicts, but it does not fully account for their existence.
    Instead of emphasizing these political factors, Turkey needs to demonstrate persuasively that t is not a water rich, water surplus country. Although Turkey has sufficient water resources for the time being, it may find itself in the near future  faced by a situation in which it will not be able to meet all of its own water needs.  Due to  the imbalance in the geographic distribution of existing water resources, topographic and technical limitations, the water potential of Turkey cannot be fully utilized. Particularly the western regions of the country are even now faced with  serious problems of water shortage. For instance, Istanbul, will be seriously short of water until a huge water transfer project comes on  stream early in the next century. (42)  In the Euphrates and Tigris basin, the following points concerning water resources management and allocation should be addressed: 1/ conflicting data on the  irrigation potential of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers needs to be resolved. 2/ the tendency to base assessments solely on the Euphrates river and thereby neglect water diversion possibilities from the Tigris should be overcome by estimates of resource potential  of the whole EuphratesTigris basin; 3/ the allegations over the causes of the water quality  changes along the course of the Euphrates  river need to be more  objectively evaluated.
    The diverse and opposing nature of ethno-religious groups in the Middle East, which include Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Israelis, makes the management of the scarce resources a precarious venture in diplomacy, and adds to the difficulty of achieving cooperation. Moreover, shortages of water, mismanagement of natural resources, and the notion of sovereignty excerpt a set of negative pressures on the foreign policy of the Middle Eastern countries. At this point,  calculating a nation's short-term benefits will not overcome the challenge. Regional problems can only be solved through common supranational approaches. only supranational solutions offer some prospect of sustainable conflict resolution. The EU's approach to solve environmental conflicts is the best available positive model at this point. The International Court of Justice is attempting to facilitate a solution to the conflict between  Hungary and Slovakia over the Danube river. (43)  Also relevant was the pressure  exerted on the two countries by the European Union in the form of achieving  resolution as a precondition for their membership in EU.
    What kind of strategies can be developed to reduce the intensity of conflict and the danger of outright violence arising from the states that are competing for access to trans-national water resources within the Middle East Region? Confidence building measures , conflict resolution,  techniques will be needed  to address this urgent challenge. Preventive Diplomacy, in international relations and confidence building techniques are generally receiving greater attention in recent years. Resource management diplomacy is one form of  preventive diplomacy that contains great promise. The idea is to argue upon sustainable uses of  natural resources so as to reach a sensitive balance between economic development and environmental protection. It is a pre-condition of arriving at stable solutions that mutual interests and benefits are taken into consideration and realized.    The best  solution of such a deep conflict, as in the Middle East, is to establish a good  faith bridge between  countries, relying on confidence building and preventive diplomacy . Such a holding operations should be accompanied  by repaying a long term sustainable water management plan  that considers prospects for economic growth, as well as  takes account of the agricultural and environmental  situations of the three countries, and on these bases, specifies reasonable requirements for water. For such an approach to succeed, upstream countries must, become more forthcoming than in the past. This means making water available to downstream countries within the limits of fairness.
    In sum, this multi-dimensional and multiphase controversy over the water allocation rights with its complex interplay of environmental, economic, cultural, political and ethnic aspects, poses  a severe threat to peace and comprehensive security in the region.  To remove this threat peacefully, calls for  imaginative reliance on resource diplomacy in which the respective governments of the affected states act in an enlightened manner  that recognizes the interests and needs of the other as well as safeguards their own position.

 

1. Peter H. Gleick: " Water and Conflict." (InternationalSecurity, Vol. 18, No.1,pp.79-112)
2. John Kolars "Hydro-geographic Background to the Utilization of International Waters in the Middle East" (American Journal of International Law: Proceedings of the 80th Annual Meeting. 1986, p. 249-50).
3. Greg Shapland: Rivers of Discord ( St. Martin Press: New York, 1997)
4.Miriam R. Lowi: " Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water in the Middle East" (Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Woodrow Wilson Center Publication,  1996,p.5)
5.Peter H. Gleick : The World's Water , The Biannual Report on Freshwater Resources 1998-99  (Island Press: Washington D.C., 1998) p.108. See also Appendix A and B Chronology of COnflict Over Water in the Legends, Myths, and History of the Ancient Middle East. pp.125-130.
6. Masahiro Murakami: Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East-Alternative Strategies  (United Nations University Press, 1995) p.34
7. According to Kolars and Mitchell these figures 98% for Turkey, and only 2% for Syria. See. The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project  (Carbonale, IL, 1991)
8. Greg Shapland: Rivers of Discord ( St. Martin Press: New York, 1997) p. 106
9.ibid. p. 106
10. ibid. p.107
11. Huseyin Pazarci: " Su Sorununun Hukuki Boyutlari", (Orta Dogu Ulkelerinde Su Sorunu, Tesav Yayinlari: Ankara, 1994)
p. 52
12. Turkish Official Gazette, (Resmi Gazete) October 15, 1966. According to this agreement, initially Turkey agreed upon release a minimum of 350 cum/s of water. This formula became the basis for a tense ,odus vivendi among three countries
13. Thomas Naff & Ruth Matson : Water in the Middle East; Conflict or Cooperation?  (Westview Press, 1984), p. 42.
14. Gun Kut; "Burning Waters: The Hydropolis of the Euphrates and Tigris"  New Perspectives on Turkey,1993,p.6.
15. Ali Ishan Bagis: G.A.P. Southeastern Anatolia Project, The Cradle of Civilization Regenerated. Istanbul: Interbank, 1989.
16. "Water Wars in the Middle East," The Economist, May 12, 1990, pp.54-59.
17. Olcay Unver: "Regional Socioeconomic Development and Water: The Southeastern Anatolia Project of Turkey", ( Unpublished Paper presented in Workshop held inParis March 1998:Averting Water Crisis in the Middle East: Make Water a Medium of Cooperation Rather Than Conflict)
18. ibid:p.103
19. Gun Kut; Note, p. 8
20.Resmi Gazete, Turkish Official Journal, December 10, 1987
21. See David Kushner; "Conflict and Accomodation in Turkish-Syrian Relations," Syria Under Assad Eds:Moshe Ma'oz & Avner Yaniv, 1993, pp.85,95-97; H.J.SKutel; "Turkey's Kurdish Problem" Conflists in the Middle East, 1993,pp.3-5.
22. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon; "On the Treshold: Environmental CHanges as Causes of Acute Conflict,: ( in Global Dagers, Eds. Lynn-Jones and Miller, Boston: The MIT Press, 1986) Note 2, p.75
23.See: Peter H. Gleick; "Water and COnflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," International Security, Vol.18, No.1, p.94, footnote 30,
24. Turkish Daily News, January 13, 1996.
25. Chris Cragg, " Water Resources in the Middle East and North Africa" Middle and North Africa, 1993, pp.177-180.
26. Hussein A.Amery & W.Andy Knight, " Confidence Building Measures and the MAnagement of Scarce Water Resources in the Middle East" ( Unpublished discussion Paper).
27.Turkish Daily News; February 14, 1996
28. THe Wall Street Journal; October 1998
29.Aaron T. Wolf & Jesse H.Hamner; "Trends in Transboundary water Disputes and Dispute resolution" (Unpublished paper presented at a workshop Green Cross International, march 1998, Paris)
30. Peter Gleick; " Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," Note 2, p.117.
31. Aaron T. Wolf & Jesse H. Hamner; p. 120
32 The ILA has been very productive and influential in the clarification and development of this law. See: "Helsinki Rules", 52 ILA Conference Report 484 (1996), and "Seoul RUles", 62 COnference Report 251, 1986.
33. The ILC adopted 33 " draft articles" on the law of non navigational uses of international watercourses and resolution on confined transboundary groundwater. The ILC submitted these instruments to the United Nations General Assembly and recommended the elaboration of convention on the basis of the draft articles. ( See: Report of the iLC on the work of its fory-sixth session, UN GAOR, 49th Session Supplement No.10, at 195, UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994)
34. For the Convention, see GA Res. 51/229, annex ( may 21, 1997), 36 (ILM) 700 (1997).
35. Stephen C. McCaffrey and Mpazi Sinjela; " Current Developments: The United Nations Convention on International Watercourses", (American Journal of International Law Vol. 92, 1998, p.97-102)
36.Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972), and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992)
37. See: Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment Oxford: Oxford Press, 1992; p.230.
38. Article IV, V of the ILA Helsinki Rules; Article 5,6 of the ILC 1994 Draft Articles.
39.Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope; " Environmental Scarcity and Freshwater Resources", (Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 1994 p.41.
40. Peter Kemp; " Special Report: Water" ( MEED, 27 January 1995)
41.  Turkish Daily News, January  5, 1996.
42.  Water, MEED Special Report, January 26, 1996.
43. See: Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment. <http://www.icj-cij.org>. International Court of Justice, September 25, 1997.

     In his charge to the panel, "A Conversation on Academia and Research Into Water Issues," Clovis Maksoud calls for new ideas and strategies to stimulate creative thinking about  water science and policy research with the aim of finding more effective ways of integrating research findings into multimedia supported teaching curricula at all levels. This is intended to broaden understanding of issues so that pressing local water needs can be more effectively dealt with through existing national and international technical, institutional and economic instruments  for improving water supply and quality, limiting water demand, resolving conflicts, and stimulating more rational and humane management of water resources, especially in the Global South. Dr. Maksoud's charge, when considered in the wider context of the Conference proceedings and recommendations,  raises a number of questions and  suggests possible approaches that can usefully inform and guide technical curriculum development efforts, while generating new perspectives on water policy development.
     First, as Richard Falk pointed out in his concluding remarks to the Conference, there is a wide gap between global perspectives on the 'crisis' of water scarcity and degradation, and the availability of practical solutions for regional and local problems of water scarcity. It is increasingly problematic whether national and international water institutions and capital-intensive engineering solutions are up to the task of simultaneously addressing these universal constraints while having to respond to increasingly desperate  human needs and environmental pressures in many localities. The efficacy of supply-oriented policy approaches is questionable, especially in the Global South, because traditional dispute settlement procedures, and public and private investment strategies for supply enhancement, are increasingly seen as inadequate, too expensive,  or ecologically harmful. Engineering limitations and financial shortfalls are also exacerbated by politically-charged disputes over water access and quality maintenance that have already led to bitter conflicts among nations in the Jordan Valley, the Tigris-Euphrates, Nile, and Ganges basins, and other areas.
 What alternatives do we have  in this critical situation? What new approaches are necessary? To begin, there must be better fit between the potential benefits of external technical, financial. and management contributions to regional and national water planning, development, regulation, and quality control, and the capacity of national and local entities to take advantage of  this external support while still responding adequately to local needs in a manner consistent with cultural realities and economic constraints.  This means that adjustment to scarcity becomes an ongoing process that must continually redefine local institutions, priorities, and response capabilities in face of extreme pressures. Abdulla Althary's presentation on Yemen's water program suggests some of the challenges and opportunities implicit in the need to adjust to an intolerable situation where critical  water shortage threatens political and economic stability and public health.  It also vividly points up the impressive resiliency of  social and cultural institutions to specific challenges in an area where aquifers are being depleted at a more rapid rate than anywhere else in the world, and where it was predicted in the early 1990's that Yemen's capital, Sana'a, would run out of water within a decade. Mr. Althary described how a Western style water planning and management framework, the National Water Authority, is being introduced in Yemen with external bilateral and multilateral support. Supply, treatment, and storage systems are under construction, regulatory mechanisms and pricing systems are being developed, and sensitivity to the implications of the critical water problem now shapes virtually every aspect of domestic and international policy.  In Yemen, the true challenges and limits  of 'sustainable development' are being defined and circumscribed through the implementation of the water program. The technical and human dimensions of water supply and conservation reflect a distinctive Yemeni response to environmental stress.
     One particularly striking element of this process is the role of  NGOs in facilitating change. It was recognized early on that local NGO participation in the interdisciplinary planning group for the National Water Authority could help make foreign economic and engineering strategies more acceptable in the context of traditional historical and cultural imperatives of agricultural and urban water use that must be accommodated in a new integrated rural-urban water management program. Yemeni social organization defines patterns of water allocations that traditionally supported a higher priority of water use for irrigated agriculture than for urban domestic supply.
     Mr. Althary mentioned that an NGO was formed in 1995 to promote water conservation. In personal communication with Mr. Althary, I learned that the NGO initiative is helping to reshape the imbalance in water supply  which traditionally favored powerful rural agricultural interests with kinship and other ties to powerful government officials. The grassroots NGO role is educational and suggests that in face of the water crisis, fundamental readjustments in water-related social roles and power structures can be made. NGO participation is facilitating public involvement in response to an intolerable situation by broadening the support base for the technical supply, treatment, regulatory, and public health goals of the national water program.
     The Yemen water NGO experience is significant beyond its contribution to the impressive effort underway to deal with a national water crisis.  It is an excellent example of the growing importance of NGOs throughout the Global South in educating publics and providing a vehicle for community input into  national and international sustainable development initiatives that inevitably disrupt traditional society-environment relations. The major role of NGOs in generating, transmitting, and interpreting information relating to the human implications of environment and development tradeoffs was amply demonstrated at  the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and continues to be evident in the ongoing climate change negotiations. Consideration of other cases of water-focused NGO activity in other areas at various scales in a web-based curricular format would serve a valuable function by documenting successful adaptations and creative solutions to the growing challenges of water shortages around the world.

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3

WOW is conceived of a teaching and research effort that intends to add to the understanding and research on water issues, especially in the context of dispute and development.

The WOW project that makes water issues and research into it an integral part of curricula in classrooms around the world.  A multi(c)media project could be the focal point for such as effort, built as part of a distance learning project.
This understanding and awareness will use an existing effort called the Global Classroom.  The Global Classroom is a project I direct and intends to reach out in the research and dissemination of information of a variety of global issues such as water.  One Global Classroom initiative is the a project called Water on the Web or WOW.  The purpose of WOW is to research water issues at a wide variety of universities and institutions (c)(c) thereby adding to understanding (c)(c) and to integrate water issues into curricula around the world  (c)(c) thus creating awareness of a refined nature.

 The Global Classroom is a vehicle for distance learning.  It is based on teaching students both technical and conceptual skills. The technical skill is in learning computer programming for the Web.  The conceptual skill is in learning a categorical case study approach that can be applied to a subject such as "Water, Dispute and Development."  These case studies can both be input to more advanced research as well as outputs from pedagogical cooperation.

The Global Classroom project includes two basic components.

How to Participate in WOW

There are three ways to participate in the WOW project using the materials described above.

The WOW Home Page

Here is the address of the WOW project.
/lee/class/wow.htm

One the WOW home page there are several options.

1.  There are hyper(c)links to about 20 cases studies on water that already have been undertaken by students in several classes at several universities.

2.  Each WOW case consists of 16 categories for reporting the information and combines with textual information.  The coding allows the project to build sort engines and search the cases by certain attributes.  The format for coding is explained.

3.  A WOW case format, already coded in HTML (Hyper(c)Text Markup Language) can be downloaded and used to make the creation of a case study relatively simple.  The completed file can then be emailed to us where we can post it along with the other WOW cases jlee@american.edu

4.  A list of possible WOW cases is included to select topics from.

We have received participation from not only many different universities but many different types of participants.  At the first conference we provided some hyperlinks to key organizations do work on water and showed that information the Web.  These links were collected by a grade school class in Virginia.  If teenagers are willing to participate, I am hopeful that this can be a widespread and useful effort to many people.
 

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