PRESENTATIONS
BY:
1.
Message
from H.M. Queen Noor of Jordan
I
very much regret not being able to join you today, but as Chair of the
Advisory Board of the Center for the Global South at American University,
I would like to welcome you and to thank Dr. Clovis Maksoud and his colleagues
for their vision and effort in organizing this event. The multi-sectoral,
truly global nature of this conference again highlights the valuable role
of the Center for the Global SOuth as a meeting place for people and ideas
from the whole world.
We are all well aware of the troubling nature, scope and consequences of
the global water threat -- especially in the South. Time only makes the
threat more complex, and the required actions and solutions more urgent.
Water problems increasingly lead to serious consequences at several levels.
Domestic, regional and global aspects of the water challenge include economic
distortions, environmental degradation, political resentment, hyper-urbanization,
and corruption, along with cross-border claims and armed conflicts,
sanitation-related disease epidemics, and wasteful military spending.
This
meeting, therefore, appropriately includes speakers from numerous geographical
and sectoral perspectives. Their presentation at this meeting will include
facts and figures that will paint a worrying picture of one of the world's
most valuable resources. The situation in the Middle East and North Africa
region is even worse than other parts of the world, for we have 5% of the
world's population, but less than 1% of the Earth's renewable fresh
water. Our per capita water supply, already one third of its 1960
level, will be halved again by the year 2025 ( to reach 650 cubic meters
per person), due to high population growth rates. Shortages are compounded
by problems of pollution, mismanagement, waste and outright political or
civil theft. Perhaps as much as the rightful restitution of lands
occupied by war, the issue of equitable water sharing rights is at the
core of the Arab Israeli conflict, and threatens to spill over to other
states in the region. We in Jordan have experienced not only political
resentment at the perceived lack of water benefits from the peace treaty
with Israel, but more recently this past summer, the serious political,
social and economic implications of a severe water crisis.
Water disputes may also promote international conflicts, for 40% of the
world's population lives in international river basins, and more than 200
water basins are shared by two or more countries. Widespread transboundary
water degradation already generates tensions between states that threaten
to increase in the future.
As inhabitants of a spatially limited ecosystem dependent on fresh water
resources, we must promote intensive coordination among many concerned
parties. Domestic, regional and global actors must work together in the
fields as diverse as demography, industry, the law, agriculture, health
and transport. The public and private sectors academia, non governmental
organizations, and multinational bodies must forge new partnerships to
achieve comprehensive water planning and management policies that are equitable,
effective and sustainable.
We must focus not only on generating new sources of water, but also on
deciding together how we can best prioritize and protect those water supplies
that are available and renewable. We must learn how riparian states can
work together to protect common wetlands, coastal zones, marine fisheries,
and other valuable water resources that are in danger of over exploitation
or irreversible degradation.
If water problems that cause distress in many parts of the South are left
unresolved, they and their consequences will surely migrate to the North
in due time. We are therefore challenged to identify the possibilities
for international legal and diplomatic action to prevent conflicts and
mass suffering before they occur; to set water use priorities based on
equity and technical efficacy and guarantee every human being access to
sufficient food, clean water, and adequate sanitation facilities; and to
advocate among the political power centers of state and society for a more
enlightened and rigorous approach to water sector management.
We must collectively make urgent progress in public awareness, sustainable
and ecosystem-based policies, institutional capacities, transnational cooperation,
and the use of preventive hydro-diplomacy. The world's numerous water problems
and threats are still manageable, all still amenable to technical and political
solutions. the world's physical resources of water are sufficient for good
quality of life -- but only if we manage this resource fairly and diligently.
You are particularly well suited to emphasize the common faith of North
and South alike on this matter -- and also to help prompt coordinated global
awareness and political will for common action. I wish you well in your
deliberations, and shall look forward with utmost interest to learning
about the results of your deliberations.
back to the
top.
2.
INTERVENTION
Presented by Mona
Makram-Ebeid
Former member of
Parliament (Egypt)
Public Scholar,
Woodrow Wilson Center
I
have been asked as a chair of this panel to offer some introductory remarks
on water issues and why it is necessary for Academia and Research to get
involved in it. However, before starting, I would like to pay tribute to
the tremendous efforts that the Center for the Global South and its dynamic
and legendary director Dr. Clovis Maksoud are exerting in this matter.
It is not the first time that this esteemed institution, under the able
leadership and encouragement of its distinguished President, Benjamin Ladner,
has taken the initiative to consider an issue of special importance to
the world community in general and to the South in particular. Reflecting
together on a resource as vital as water reveals great deal of farsightedness
on your part, regarding this old complex problem. We thank you for providing
us with this unique opportunity.
It is fitting that the exciting project of the Global Classroom trough
the conduct of case studies be sponsored by the Center for the Global South,
and of particular interest is the importance attached to solving
water disputes. The scarcity and the feuds over water resources can be
expected to intensify unless preventative actions are taken. For one thing,
population will continue to grow for a long time before it reaches a plateau
while the supply is fast approaching its limit. Moreover, as we heard yesterday,
in the outstanding presentation of Dr. Ismail Serageldin, the global South
as a whole suffers from an endemic problem of water scarcity and
pollution both of which are likely to worsen in the future.
I come from a country where the first line in the history book reads --
Egypt is the gift of the Nile. Yet today a potential water war could erupt
between it and Sudan and Ethiopia on quantity issues if action is not taken
today to prevent violent conflicts tomorrow.
The Nile is the world's longest river and almost 123 million people depend
on the Nile waters for survival and consequently present and potential
conflict stems from the increased food and agricultural needs generated
by a rapidly growing population in the riparian states. One of the primary
reasons for the expansion of irrigated agriculture into the desert of Egypt
is to quell social unrest caused by unemployment and overcrowding of cities,
That is why it should be recognized that between states factors of geopolitics
and hydro-politics cannot be separated from the technical, legal, economic
and environmental issues, Particularly in the Nile Basin, hydro-politics
are inextricably linked to interstate politics. Indeed, the general relations
between Sudan and Egypt have determined the level of water conflict at
times and not vice versa.
For instance, the friendly cooperation of the two on water issues came
to an abrupt halt not because of the ascension of an unfriendly regime
in Khartoum. THe complexity of the issue thus demands a much more comprehensive
approach than the usual negotiations at the level of foreign ministries
.The financial support of the UNFAO and USAID are hopeful signs that third
parties are beginning to act preventively on water issues. In the Nile
Basin, cooperation has been facilitated, even spurred, by efforts to collect
basin-wide data like Hydromet project.
In other words, hydro-diplomacy needs to be adopted instead of the usual
diplomatic channel in order to pave the way for riparian cooperation, particularly
that with macroeconomics stabilization in most emerging markets in the
South is prodding decentralization to be on the move, this translates into
a shift of political and financial decision making from the center to the
periphery which itself is a reflection of deep and hopefully lasting transformations
in these societies.
And here I would like to underline the importance of popular support. Without
popular support it is difficult to implement any interstate river sharing
arrangements, even if it can be achieved between the regimes. In order
to promote an effective and equitable implementation of any agreement,
there is a need to accentuate the use of public involvement and participation
as an important means of increasing awareness of water resources planning
as a way of minimizing scope of the conflict.
True development is one in which economic progress and environmental enhancement
go hand in hand and are mutually reinforcing. That is why people
have to be not only the object but also the subject of development. It
is the people themselves --all the people-- who have to decide what services
they want; it is the people to whom the service institutions have to be
responsive and accountable; it is the affected people who have to make
the decisions ( based on information from technicians on environmental
policies and standards).
It is needles to stress how important the role of women in water management
is. They are the ones who are most affected by lack of adequate water and
sanitation services, and they are the ones that form the bulk of these
living in degraded environments throughout the developing world. They should
be the first targets at the popular level of efforts to increase their
awareness, for educating them, for changing their attitudes and involving
them in neighborhood associations. This will involve a much greater role
for the private sector in the provision of such services via both non-formal
and formal institutions.
The overriding challenge to the developing world today is to improve the
well being of the poor in a way that is both environmentally and financially
sustainable. Awesome as this challenge is, a timely conference as the one
we are engaged in today, is an indication that there is an emerging consensus
on what needs to be done and how to do it. This will require effort from
us all.
back to the top
3.
COOPETITION
OVER WATER
Constructing
Institutions to Combat Scarcity
by Ashok
Swain, Associate Professor,
Department
of Peace and Conflict Research,
Uppsala
University, Sweden
and
Patrik Stalgren
Department
of Political Science,
Gothenburg
University
1. Water Coopetition: Competition leading to Cooperation
Seventy five percent of earth's surface is covered by water. The total
water available in our planet is 1.41 billion cubic kilometers. This much
of water is sufficient to cover a depth of nearly three kilometers over
the earth's surface. However, most of it is saltwater and some of the remaining
is stored in ice caps, glaciers, underground, in the soil, in the atmosphere,
and in living beings. Excluding lakes, only about 2,000 cubic kilometers
of fresh water found mainly in rivers, is available for human consumption.
Between 1940 and 1980, world's water use has been doubled. By the end of
this millennium, it will double again. It is predicted that between 44
and 65 per cent of the world's population will face some consequences of
water scarcity or water stress by the middle of the next century (Falkenmark
1990, Lonergran 1996). There is a serious uneven regional distribution
of the water resource. Annual run-off in North America is 17,000 cubic
kilometers while Africa has only 6000. The poor countries are in those
regions of the world where water is scarce and availability is erratic
due o climatic reasons. Not only they have less water in the South, but
there is a growing demand for it, which has led to serious concerns particularly
among the users in the developing regions.
This situation is due to several reasons. One is the massive population
growth especially in the developing world. However, not only the surging
human numbers, countries in the South are also subjected to rapid industrialization,
massive urbanization, and intensifying agricultural activities. All these
increase the demand for water resources as well as pollute the supply.
Many developing countries are already facing serious problems in meeting
the rapidly increasing water demands. In order to meet the demands, they
are exploiting the available water resource further. The over-exploitation
of water resources can result in an acute shortage. In this scarcity situation,
water increasingly has become a source of social tension as social actors
are bound to be worried about the present or future availability of the
water resource. They may work purposefully and consciously to maximize
the availability of water resource. Water will bring further competition
and create conflict and that can destroy the on-going arrangements of water
distribution. Even though such tensions are omnipresent they tend to become
more complex and difficult when they concern international rivers. According
to a recently published World Bank Technical Paper (414: 1998), more than
245 river basins are shared by two or more countries. Nearly 40 percent
of the world population and fifty percent of total land are dependent on
the waters of these shared river basins.
Competition over the international river water can be observed at all levels
of society: not only between the riparian countries, but also among the
competing users within the basin countries. When several actors are jointly
dependent on the same river system, one's withdrawal and pollution can
potentially lead to conflicts. A number of researchers are of the opinion
that the dependence of many developing countries on external supply of
water may force them to orient their national security concern in order
to protect or preserve the water availability (Gleick 1993, Homer-Dixon
1994). In the mid-1980s, The Central Intelligence Agency of USA estimated
that there were at least ten places in the world where war could break
out due to scarcity of fresh water. Most of these hotshots are in the Middle
East and the rest in Asia and Africa (Starr 1991). This conflict scenario
has brought the issue of water to the 'high politics'. Politicians as well
as media are of the opinion that the scarcity of water is replacing oil
as the source of conflict. UN officials and World Bank analysts are regularly
proclaiming that "the previous war was about oil, the next war will be
about water." In short, it has now become fashionable to see the greatest
threats to the world's security in the coming century as coming from "water
wars" (Seabright 1997).
Fortunately these 'water wars' are yet to be translated into reality. As
Toset and Gleditsch (1998) accept the possibility of armed conflict over
water scarcity they nonetheless deny its inevitability. In several cases,
the competing riparian countries are moving towards cooperation rather
than armed conflicts. The growing competition over the waters of the Mekong,
Ganges and Zambezi have resulted in cooperative arrangements in the 1990s.
Thus competition may result in cooperation to maximize the benefits of
the water use in order to meet the growing demand. Adding to the historical
pattern, water in general and rivers in particular have been seen as the
source for nation building. However, given the increased scarcity of water,
the pattern of cooperation and construction of societies around water is
now infused with much competition increasing the need for institutions
to regulate the human encounter around water and facilitate coopetition
and hence bring people together.
For the appropriate and competent management of an international river
basin, there is a need for building on institutions that are in place at
international, and as well as in basin level. International institutions
and legal principles can provide guidelines for the basin based arrangements
to emerge. That will facilitate coopetition: by bringing the competing
riparians together and working on finding a common agreement for cooperation.
Evidence suggests, however, that cooperative arrangements among the riparian
states can not last if they are not interacting with and supported by the
institutions for proper water management at the basin level.
2.
International Institutions and Legal Principles for International River
Management
There have been numerous endeavors to establish and strengthen international
institutions and create an international legal framework to manage the
international rivers.
The World Water Council (WWC) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) are
two major international 'water' institutions that have been established
in the 1990s. The International Conference on Water and Environment at
Dublin in 1992 created the WWC. It aims to promote awareness of critical
water issues and works for efficient, sustainable conservation and management
of fresh water. This non-governmental organization works to provide an
independent forum for exchanging views and information, for sharing experience
and concerns, and for recommending actions on water management. The WWC
was formally established with its secretariat located in Marseille, France
in June 1996. While the WWC is essentially a forum for discussion, the
GWP comprises of organizations with financial powers to carry out programs.
In August 1995, the World Bank and UNDP proposed the creation of this organization
and it was open to all parties involved in water resource management. The
GWP, with its secretariat in Stockholm, Sweden, brings together a large
number of organizations that includes aid agencies in an informal partnership
to tackle the many challenges in the water supply. The GWP promotes integrated
programs at regional and national levels. It helps capacity building and
sustainable investment across national boundaries.
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is also an important funding organization
to help developing countries to protect their environment. The GEF, which
has been created as an agreement between UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank
is being used as a basis to promote dialogue among the riparian countries
on the watershed degradation of the shared river systems.
These on-going global initiatives to address the issue of fresh water have
brought the international river sharing problem to the limelight. There
have been also numerous individual attempts made, for instance, by the
World Bank, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and FAO in finding
ways of successfully sharing the international watercourses among the states.
In recent years, World Bank is refusing to finance the projects on disputed
international watercourses and insisting upon agreement between riparian
nations. This has increased the incentives for regional actors to institutionalize
their cooperation. UNEP and FAO are currently involved in various ways
to facilitate cooperation among the international river basin countries,
particularly in Africa. Besides these institutional support for the management
of shared rivers, there is an on-going move towards establishing a common
legal framework to address the sharing of international watercourses at
the global level.
The International Law Association (ILA) made several attempts since 1956
to establish 'principle of equitability' in sharing the international river
water. The 'principle of equitability' advocates the maximum benefit accruing
to all the riparians, keeping in mind their economic and social needs.
When ILA's Helsinki Rules was placed before the UN General Assembly, it
could not be agreed as a model for sharing international rivers by the
member-states, particularly due to opposition from the upstream nations.
Then UNGA recommended that the International Law Commission (ILC) should
take up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses with a view to its progressive development and codification.
After two and half decades of deliberations, the ILC submitted its draft
in 1996 for the consideration of the UN General Assembly. Finally, the
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
was adopted by the United General Assembly on 21 May 1997. This Convention
has been submitted to the member-states for their ratification.
By keeping both the principles, the equitable utilization and not to cause
significant harm in its text, the UN Convention has been able to get the
majority support in the UNGA (103 for, 3 against and 27 abstentions). As
Stephen McCaffrey (1998) describes the Convention as "a basket of Halloween
Candy: there is something in it for everyone." By doing this, the Convention
has been successful to get the majority support in UNGA, but whether it
will be able to address the issues over sharing specific international
rivers remains a question. The major problem may arise while defining the
equitable use and also, its conflict with the no-harm principle.
Even if this Conventions gets ratified by member-states and becomes a legal
framework, it will not be self-sufficient in itself to address the problem
of water sharing in different parts of the world. The sharing of the international
rivers among the riparians in different geographical regions is a problem
of huge magnitude. Complex water disputes will only be solved by cooperation
and compromise, not by strict insistence of rules of law. International
Court of Justice's verdict on the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case confirms it.
Thus, a lasting solution to the international river basin sharing demands
a much more comprehensive endeavor than a single piece of legal proposition
(Swain 1997). The absence of any international guidelines on the sharing
of joint rivers has not deterred some river basins to work for a cooperative
management of their shared waters. With some help from the international
institutions, the riparian countries of these international rivers are
coming together to get the maximum benefit of the common water. However
these coopetive approach of the riparian states needs to be translated
into a comprehensive and systematic effort in order to distance the management
of the river resource from the fragmented control of the individual riparian
states to a single management unit.
3.
Managing International Rivers
An international river does not, per definition, confine itself into national
boundaries. Non the less the shared rivers should be treated as single
units for the maximum utilization of their resources. The development of
river water occurs most optimally on the basin-wide level. The whole river
basin is needed to be regarded as an economic, ecological and political
unit irrespective of state boundaries and the waters are vested in the
community. Under an integrated program of development of a river, water
projects are to be located at the best available locations. Further, notwithstanding
geographic divisions along political lines, a management solution involving
a wide range of basin based riparians can bring mutual benefits, such as
right to submerge upstream land in return for availing hydro-power or supply
of water to one state and electricity to another. The benefits of these
projects should be allocated taking into account the need of riparians
as well as who has made what scarifies to realize these projects. This
approach includes joint planning, joint construction, joint management
and joint cost sharing. The regulation and management of an international
river basin should be entrusted in the hands river basin commissions, who
are outside the political control of any one basin riparian.
`
Experiences from Indus (1960 Treaty between India and Pakistan) River suggests
that where riparian countries have been able to establish cooperative arrangements,
successful and sustainable development programs have followed (Kirmani
& Rangeley 1994). Establishment of a river basin commission on shared
rivers certainly brings further international collaboration and external
assistance. Due to resource constraints, riparian countries particularly
in Asia and Africa are increasingly being aware of the opportunity cost
for not cooperating with each other. Water scarcity and lack of financial
resources is gradually encouraging the riparians to cooperate with each
other in order to achieve optimal benefit. But in many cases, riparian
countries in the South are unable to establish institutional cooperative
arrangements because of their concern regarding existing and future water
rights. Mutual suspicion and uncertainties of reciprocal action are affecting
the constructive engagement. To overcome it, they need credible and impartial
international assistance.
The change of attitude by the international financial institutions and
bilateral aid programs may provide incentives for these basin based cooperation.
These organizations are required to be proactive in their approach also.
The international lending institutions and donor agencies can assume a
facilitator role in encouraging early collaborative and participatory efforts
among the basin states. They have financial resources which can be used
as incentives for riparian states to come together even in the face of
individual self interest (Priscoli 1994). The basin-based institutional
arrangement on shared rivers can bring all riparian countries greater benefits
than what they could have achieved through their purely state-centric development.
Most of the South is exposed to water stress or even water scarcity. The
adoption of the supply management strategy only to address the water shortage
in the region is not sufficient enough. To meet the growing demand, there
is a need to minimize water use, particularly in the agricultural sector
which uses water most. This can be achieved in two ways: stop exporting
"virtual water" and start importing "virtual water" if you are a water
deficient region. "Virtual water" means the agricultural products that
have been produced with large amounts of water (Focus 1995/96). Following
these two principles - by stopping the production of water intensive agricultural
products for export purposes and importing water intensive agricultural
products from water abundant regions - would decrease water demands in
the river basin. River basin may opt for a planned allocation of agricultural
activities in their various regions in order to meet the future demand
for the food. This is not possible without the establishment of river basin
commissions. These river basin commissions may be the right institutions
for innovating technical developments to facilitate a more efficient usage
of the water in the basin. Affirmative actions can be taken to find such
new solutions. For example how to make efficient usage of the dew and how
to irrigate without exposing the water to evaporation. Special interest
can be paid to endogenous knowledge investigating how water allocation
has been dealt within societies that have experienced long periods of water
shortage.
To facilitate the participation of all the riparian countries in a meaningful
joint endeavor and treating the basin as a single unit outside the control
of individual states, the nation-states are required to be flexible in
their approach. The flexibility is the central to successful negotiation
of agreement among the riparian states in building basin-based institutions
on international rivers. Generally, the sharing issues of international
river are commonly handled by foreign ministry officials rather than being
given to bureaucrats and technocrats in water resource ministry (LeMarquand
1977). Foreign Ministry officials are usually unable to understand the
water issues, which brings lack of interest and lead to relatively long
negotiations and unsuccessful resolutions. Understanding of the problem
is necessary for the negotiators to find the ways and means for the conflict
management and mutual cooperation. As Mandel (1991) has pointed out, the
source of the international river sharing is a highly complex issue as
it encompasses such diverse discipline as ecology, economics, social psychology,
religion, cultural anthropology, engineering, hydrology, and geopolitics.
For a regular foreign ministry bureaucrat, it is not easy to grasp the
complexity of the issue involved. Water resource management in general
and sharing of international rivers in particular is also a continuously
changing process. There is the need for the national negotiators for coping
with, and adjusting to such changes as well as understanding conceptual,
methodological and institutional shifts.
Political interest by the leaders of river basin countries may help to
overcome the bureaucratic red tapes in order to reach a common understanding.
There is a growing public awareness in South about the importance of water
resources. Common incentives and reciprocal disadvantages should be projected
effectively by the state and leadership in order to calm down the emotional
aspects in the water sharing issue. Without popular support, it is difficult
to implement any river basin arrangement even if it can be achieved between
the regimes. Popular support is not sufficient in itself. In order to establish
an effective river basin commission, there is a need to strengthen the
national and local water institutions and accentuate the community participation
in them.
4.
Predicaments in Building Basin Based Institutions
The problems associated with establishing cooperative management around
a common water resource are interestingly framed within the analysis of
so called social dilemmas. (Ostrom 1990, 1997). At the core of the problem
of establishing and maintaining sustainable water management is hence the
question of how to overcome this dilemma. The nature of a social dilemma
situation is that interdependent actors all have free access to freshwater
resource and all faces choices where the maximization of short-term self-interest
yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off than if coopetition
could be established.
The conventional wisdom of how to establish and maintain social coopetition
is that there are basically two solutions. The first builds from the use
of the executive power of an external political authority such as the apparatus
of a nation state or a political actor in the international community.
The second conventional solution draws on the mechanism of self-interest,
profit maximization and property rights incorporated in a market economy.
The two strategies mirror much of the philosophical debate drawing from
thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke respectively. Reviewing some
of the most advocated policies to initiate development in the developing
regions one can also see how the logic of state-centric organizations and
the market has been dominating in different phases of the post-colonial
era (Harbeson 1989, Randell and Theobald 1985, Smekal 1991). However, much
empirical as well as theoretical research has identified a number of problems
with these strategies in relation to the ambition to transcend the problems
of coopetition and solve the social dilemma.
The basic idea of the solution based on an authoritative political body
such as the state is that it should determine the level of exploration
of the resources at hand. The general problems associated to the actual
determination of such a level are multifolded in a situation were the quantity
and the quality of the resources is under constant change - as is the case
with the international rivers. The nature of a river system also implies
that the implementation of the policy will have to relate to a large
number of varying empirical settings in the riparian areas. In principle
these problems of policy implementation are universal (Ostrom 1990). However,
they are certainly accentuated by the ambiguous role of the state and state
based institutions in the South's institutional landscape.
The general idea of the market-based solution to a social dilemma is to
alter the structure of utility incentives, i.e. the costs and payoffs,
of the situation by the definition and separation of private property rights.
Once again the nature of a river system proposes difficulties as it comes
to the definition of property rights. The questionable capacity of the
state in many Southern societies also poses problems as it comes to the
juridical institutions necessary to sustain a system of property rights
(Gibbon 1995, Anangwe 1995).
Complementing the two commonly proposed strategies eminent theoretical
as well as empirical assessments underpin the call for a more comprehensive
approach to international river water management. Considering the complexity
of the task this argument states the need to base the solution of the social
dilemma on the principals i. e. on those actors, state or non-state, which
are in some way physically linked to the common resource constituted by
the international rivers. Well aware of the fact that this physical linkage
may imply different degrees of actual dependence on the river, special
emphasis should be on those principals which are local 'core' actors in
water policy and water management networks not considering, ex ante, whether
or not they are state or non state actors .
The physical interdependence of individual actors in the river basin catchment
areas is seen here as a problem of provision and appropriation of a common
pool resource, CPR , i.e. "a resource system that is sufficiently large
as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries
from obtaining benefits from its use" (Ostrom 1990:30). It is the combined
stock and flow aspects of CPR's that pose intricate problems. As a stock,
the international river water is a collective good, subject to common usage.
Individual appropriators can not be effectively cut out from using the
resource. Nor can they be easily blocked from reaping the benefits of improvements
and changes in the provision of the river water, made by others. On the
other hand, individual users can subtract resource units from the river
stock. The units are, in effect, equal to private goods for the appropriators.
Cooperation among river water appropriators involves costs and benefits
that are much more difficult to estimate and more insecure to the users
than their present, short-term individual utility-maximizing behavior.
This implies to individual users that they may or must sacrifice short-term
private gain (Lundqvist 1996).
Still, what is really needed to achieve a sustainable regime seen as legitimate
and binding by those concerned is a supply of institutions, i.e., of principles,
norms and regulations which cumulatively affect the actions taken and the
outcomes obtained in using the river water. These guiding principles can
be grouped as follows; First, for the daily activities towards the water
resource, operational rules directly affect appropriator decisions as to
when, where, and how to withdraw water, how monitoring and supervision
should be carried out and by whom, what information resource users should
provide or get, and which sanctions or rewards should be meted out in relation
to which types of behavior. Second, collective choice rules determine policies,
and thus which operational rules should be in force. Third, constitutions
affect operational activities and results in that they determine which
actors are eligible to participate in river water-related collective decision-making.
They also specify the procedures and aggregation rules to be used when
making such collective decisions (Ostrom 1991).
No matter if one sets out to construct sustainable basin-based water management
institutions to manage the international rivers contextual considerations
are of eminent importance. However, the complexity associated with sustainable
management institution does not only derive from technical and geographic
condition. Of utmost importance is the consideration of the social and
cultural institutions at hand. Appreciating the importance of a policy
sensitive to the prevailing formal structures calls for a more a more comprehensive
understanding of contextual institutions in international river basins.
Recognizing the salience of contextual sensitivity constructing a water
management institution, one must not only consider incumbent formal institutions
but also include a focus on the informal institutions carrying socially
transmitted information preventing, permitting and prescribing social and
political behavior (March & Olsen 1989, North 1990, Elster 1989). Policies
recognizing this comprehensive understanding of contextual institutions
in the region will be able to match enduring patterns of behavior that
has developed from the way people have organized as individuals, groups
or classes to utilize and exploit scarce material and social resources.
5.
Dealing with the Dilemmas
The "social dilemma" occurs because the actions and the alternatives available
to the appropriators all speak in favor of non-cooperation - (as in the
Prisoners' Dilemma game situation) - or in favor of free-riding (as argued
in various theories of the impossibility of collective action (Olson 1965,
Hardin 1968). There is indeed a genuine dilemma here. Whether or not the
individual appropriator of international rivers will join in institutions
or regime building depends on his views on the credibility of other appropriators'
commitment to these institutions. For the commitment to become credible,
appropriators must succumb to supervision and monitoring. This is difficult
if there is no initial trust to start with. Trust facilitates coopetition.
Does authoritative intervention based on external interference, either
through the imposition of power from a political actor or through the initiative
of a private entrepreneur provide the answer at the community level? Theory,
as well as much of South's political history, suggests that neither state
nor market based solutions guarantee durable and sustainable solutions
to water management. The research on existing intrinsic solutions, i.e.,
institutional supply through concerted action by common property resource
appropriators, identifies a number of factors determinant for the occurrence
and sustainability of self-governed regimes. These factors will be decisive
for the sustainable management of the international rivers.
The major causes of problems in the sharing of the river water resource
stem directly from a number of institutional deficiencies. The nature of
reform of water sharing institutions demands a will to attack the situation
in a coherent and comprehensive manner. This comprehensive approach takes
into account social, environmental and economic objectives combined with
decentralized management and distribution structures and fuller participation
of stakeholders.
1. Defining Boundaries: Both the actual common resource constituted
by the international river system as such and those seen as "rightful"
appropriators of water from the system should be clearly identified. The
definition of the river system should include the tributaries and distributaries
and be considered as a joint unit. Various groups, state or non-state,
are using the water from the river system for their economic and social
activities. In the absence of proper identification of these groups and
the nature of their demand, it will impossible to find a formula of sharing.
2. Harmony Between Appropriation and Local Conditions: Appropriation
rules must restrict when, how, where and how much appropriator can withdraw
from the river. As Lundqvist and Gleick (1997) argues that the "demand
for water includes a combination of basic 'needs' and larger set of 'wants."
Basic needs for water needs to be identified and given the priority. These
allocation rules must include considerations of variations due to weather
conditions and other local physical characteristics. having a firm understanding
of the supply and demand of the water resource, the rules of appropriation
must be stated determining the rate of exchange between, on the one hand,
appropriation from the resource and, on the other hand, provision to the
CPR in terms of maintenance, resources and/or money.
3. Participatory Management: All the riparian actors should
participate in the formation of the river basin organization. Not only
the states but also the non-state stakeholders affected by operational
rules must be eligible to participate as decision-makers in modifying the
organization.
The
river is decisive for the physical survival of many of its users. The recognition
as eligible decision-makers provides an essential democratic channel mitigating
the construction and maintenance of the river management through the establishment
of legitimacy and mutual trust. Local institution can not function effectively
without popular participation in its management. The sustainable use of
river water requires stakeholder participation in all aspects of water
policy and management in the basin.
Identifying
the relevant actors for participating in the management of the water resource
one need to move beyond pinpointing actors at various institutional levels.
Social groups, such as women and other less empowered groups, should be
given special attention as they might have rightful claims on a specific
treatment in relation to the CPR. In particular, women rights and roles
should be considered as they often manage water related activities such
as irrigation and food production.
4. Judicial Framework: The maintaining of an internal and regional
management regime requires a functional judicial framework. The judicial
framework should be characterized by:
a.
Mutual Monitoring: Those who supervise
and monitor appropriators' behavior, and the condition of the river water,
are responsible to the appropriators, or are themselves appropriators.
This construction recognizing the complexity of a central authority collecting
accurate information of the consequences of the numerous riparians. It
also facilitates opportunities to construct reciprocal trust and obedience
through increasing the risk of social stigmatization if an actor defects
from the regime rules.
b.
Adjusted sanctions: The system of sanctions must include a variety
of retributive and preventive instruments. Determining the sanctions,
adherence must be paid to the seriousness of the violations and the context
of the offense rather then inflexibly fixed sanctions. To establish legitimacy,
sanctions should be meted out by the appropriators or by someone accountable
to them.
c.
Networking judicial institutions:.
An
international river basin counts among its principal core actors two or
more nation states and potentially numerous non-state actors. Given the
potential multiplicity of organizational levels in an appropriate management
regime the judicial framework must allow for appropriator to establish
local arenas to solve problems and resolve conflicts. Local arenas constitute
low-cost conflict resolutions and allow for adherence to local judicial
traditions and hence mitigates legitimacy. However, the local arenas must
be linked in a hierarchical network assuring congruence in sanctions.
5. Recognized Rights to Organize: The need for networking judicial
institutions requires a general political climate recognizing the right
to organize in general and the jurisdiction of these judicial bodies in
particular. Hence external political authorities must not challenge the
appropriators' rights to set up their own institutions. Political authorities
are also needed to act positively to build the human capacity which is
necessary for the effective community participation in water management
and institution. With the help of free flow of relevant information, providing
training and education, and allowing for a vibrant civil society, the state
can help in the capacity building of the water appropriators. Real long-term
success in river basin management depends on the ability of the community
to identify problems and formulate and implement policies and strategies.
References:
Anangwe, A., 1995. "Maintenance
of Law & Order in Western Kenya:
The State and Voluntary Organizations". pp. 105-120 in
Semboja,J., Therkildsen, O. (eds.) 1995. Service Provision under
Stress in East Africa: State, NGOs and People's Organizations in
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Copenhagen: Center for Development
Research.
Elster, Jon. 1989. The Cement
of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Falkenmark, Malin, 1990, "Global
Water Issues Confronting Humanity",
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 27, no. 2.
Feder, Gershon & Moigne,
Guy Le, "Managing Water in a Sustainable
Manner", Finance & Development, vol. 31, no. 2, June 1994.
Focus, 1995/96, "Water in the
Region: Developing a Shared Resource",
Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East, vol. 4,
no. 4, Winter 1995/96, pp. 12-15.
Gibbon, Peter (ed.), 1995. Markets,
Civil Society and Democracy in
Kenya.Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Gleick, Peter H., 1993, "Water
and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and
International Security", International Security, vol. 18,
no. 1, Summer.
Harbeson J. W., Rothschild, D.
Chazan, N. (eds.). 1994. Civil
Society AndThe State In Africa. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Hardin, G., 1968. "The Tragedy
of the Commons" Science 162; 1243-8.
Hirji, Rafik & Grey, David,
1998, "Managing International Waters in
Africa: Process and Progress", in Salman M.A. Salman & Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes, eds., International Watercourses:
Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict, World Bank Technical
Paper No. 414, The World Bank, Washington, DC, July.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., 1994,
"Environmental Scarcities and Violent
Conflict: Evidence from Cases", International Security, vol. 19,
no. 1, Summer.
Hydén, Göran, 1983.
No shortcuts to progress: African development
management in perspective. London: Heinemann.
Kirmani, Syed & Rangeley,
Robert, 1994, International Inland Waters:
Concepts for a More Active World Bank Role, World Bank Technical
Paper No. 239, The World Bank, Washington, DC, June.
LeMarcquand, David G., 1977,
International Rivers: The Politics of
Cooperation, Waterloo: University of British Columbia Press.
Lonergan, Steve, 1996, "Water
Resources and Conflict: Examples from the
Middle East", Paper Presented in the Conflict and the
Environment, NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Bolkesjo, Norway,
12-16 June.
Lundqvist, Lennart, J., 1996,
"Water Management - Towards
Catchment-Bases Solutions". Project Proposals to MISTRA.
(unpublished).
Lundqvist, Jan & Gleick,
Peter, 1997, Sustaining Our Waters into the
21st Century (Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute).
Mandel, Robert, 1991, "Sources
of International River Basin", Paper
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies
Association, Vancouver, BC, Canada, March.
March, J. G., Olson, J., P.,
1989. Rediscovering Institutions - The
Organizational Basis of Politics New York: The Free Press.
McCaffrey, Stephen, 1998, "The
UN Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects
and Pitfalls", in Salman M.A. Salman & Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, eds., International Watercourses: Enhancing
Cooperation and Managing Conflict, World Bank Technical Paper
No.414, The World Bank, Washington, DC, July.
Nordlund, Per. 1994. Organizing
Democratization: Politics and Power in
Zambia. Uppsala: Uppsala universitet.
North Douglas C., 1990. Institutions,
institutional change, and economic
performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, M., 1965. The logic
of collective action. Harvard University
Press.
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the
Commons. The Evolution of Institutions
for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Ostrom, E., 1998. A Behavioral
Approach to the Rational-Choice Theory of
Collective Action, American Political Science Review.
Priscoli, Jerome Delli, 1994,
"Conflict Resolution, Collaboration and
Management in International and Regional Water Resources Issues",
Paper Presented at the 8th Congress of the International Water
Resources Association (IWRA), Cairo, Egypt, November.
Randell, Vicky. Robin, Theobald.
1985. Political Change and
Underdevelopment: A critical introduction to Third World
Politics.London: Macmillan.
Seabright, Paul, 1997, Water:
Commodity or Social Institution?
(Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute).
Smekal, Peter, 1991. Teorier
om utveckling och underutveckling. Uppsala:
Uppsala Universitet.
Stålgren, P., 1997. "Begreppet
'civilt samhälle' i två olika samhällen -
en analys av möjligheterna till begreppsuniversalism" Göteborg
University: Department of Political Science (unpublished)
Starr, Joyce R., 1991, Water
Wars. Foreign Policy. 82: 17-36.
Swain, Ashok, 1997, "Sharing
International Rivers: The Need for A
Regional Approach", in Nils P. Gleditsch, ed., Conflict and the
Environment (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
Toset, Hanspetter W. & Nilspetter
Gleditsch, 1998, "Conflict and Shared
Rivers", Paper Presented at the Third European International
Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the International
Studies Association, Vienna, 16-19 September.
Wallensteen, Peter & Ashok
Swain, 1997, International Fresh Water
Resources: Conflict or Cooperation?, (Stockholm: Stockholm
Environment Institute).
back to
the top
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last updated January 1999
Questions or Comments, Please
contact webmaster.