Elephant and rhino poaching in Zambia (ZAMBIA Case)

     CASE NUMBER:    150
     CASE MNEMONIC:  ZAMBIA
     CASE NAME:      Elephant and rhino poaching in Zambia

A.   IDENTIFICATION
1.   The Issue
The rise in elephant and rhino poaching in Zambia has more to do with the dynamics of the global
economy than any single factor within the country.  The fall of global copper prices in the
mid-1970s - copper being Zambia's primary foreign exchange earner - forced many Zambians to
locate new sources of income.  Many Zambians began to hunt and kill rhinos (especially black
rhinos) and elephants for their ivory horns and tusks, which were sold on the domestic and
international markets.  In the 1970s, Zambia had an elephant population of about 35,000, yet by the
early 1990s only about 6,000 elephants remained (Kelso, 1993:69).  In the east, central, and
southern areas of Africa where the black rhino was dominant, less than 4,000 remain from a
population of 65,000 in 1970 (Vollers, 1987:62).  Many of these remaining rhinos are located in
Zimbabwe because the black rhino has been poached to extinction in Zambia.  Faced with the
extinction of the black rhino and the decimation of the elephant, the Zambian government initiated
several wildlife conservation policies, including cross-border agreements with Zimbabwe and
other countries where rhino and elephant poaching is common, aimed at reducing the amount of
rhino and elephant poaching.  But these conservation efforts have had little long term impacts as
many Zambian poachers have crossed the border to neighboring Zimbabwe to continue poaching.
Many poachers are now concentrating on the elephant as the few rhinos that remain come under
increasing protection (Poachers slaughter..., 1995).  Other problems - such as a continued weak
economy, limited resources for wildlife preservation, competition with local farmers for land, the
politics of wildlife legislation, and a still very lucrative global market in ivory - have made it very
difficult for the Zambian government to protect its rhino and elephant populations.  The end result
is that, today, "rhinos [and elephants] are still being killed faster than they can reproduce" (Knox,
1989:60).
2.   Description
The majestic rhinoceros and elephant once roamed freely in the 63,000 kilometers of the Luangwa
Valley in the northeastern part of Zambia.  The rhinoceros, for example, dates back about 55
million years, and is one of the earth's oldest animals (Vollers, 1987:62).  Today, all five of the
remaining rhino species - black, white, Sumatran, Indian, and Javan - are endangered because of
poaching (Ibid).  The rhino is now extinct in Zambia, and its existence is seriously threatened in
other east African countries.  Poachers have killed more than 12,000 elephants in the North
Luangwa National Park in Zambia since the 1970s (Kelso, 1993:69).  Both the Zambian
government, with support from other countries and international agencies, have attempted to halt
the continued slaughtering of rhinos and elephants.  There has been some success in reducing the
demand for ivory, especially through the 1989 ban on ivory sales, National Parks and Wildlife
activities, and strengthened wildlife legislation, including punishment for poaching offenses
(Gibson, 1995:60-63).  As weel, in 1994, nine countries (including Zambia) signed a poaching
agreement to "boost cross-border liaison and investigations against international poaching
sydicates... [and] provide a legal framework for a multinational task force of African wildlife
law enforcement officers to investigate international smuggling and poaching of Africa's wildlife
animals..." (Nine African Countries..., 1994).  Despite these efforts, a number of factors have
limited the effectiveness of Zambia's strategies at curbing rhino and elephant poaching.
(See RHINO Case).

The Weak Zambian Economy

John Cartwright (1991) has remarked in his study of conservation in Africa that "the need for
national governments to obtain foreign exchange... [and other] commercial pressures for
exploitation... work against an acceptance of protecting portions of eco-systems as a means
towards long-term ecological viability" (359).  When Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia)
gained its independence in 1964, its per capita GNP was one of the highest in Africa.  Yet today,
Zambia is ranked a low-income economy with a per capita GNP of only about $670 (World Bank,
1994:162).

The fall of the Zambian economy, and its resultant impact on local farmers and workers, can be
traced to the crash of global copper prices in the 1970s.  (See COPPER Case).  As Zambia's primary export, and thus foreign exchange
earner, copper traditionally played a very important role in the Zambian economy.  Technological
advancements in the industrialized countries lead to the substitution of materials traditionally
imported.  For example, as a result of the telecommunications revolution, many countries began to
substitute copper with high-tech fiberoptics.  While the substitution of copper with fiberoptics led
to a reduction in the demand for copper on the global economy, Zambia, as well as other copper
producing states, increased their production of copper in order to earn more foreign exchange in
the wake of the debt crisis.  This phenomenon of low demand and high supply was largely
responsible for the 40 percent drop in the value of copper on the global market in 1975 (Gibson,
1995:53).

The fall of global copper prices, and with it Zambia's foreign exchange earnings, had a devastating
effect on Zambians as incomes steadily declined and the cost of living dramatically increased.
Initially, the increase in poaching could be attributed to the expansion of the domestic market in
game meat; however, the concomitant increase in the global price of ivory fuelled the expansion of
rhino and elephant poaching in Zambia (Ibid).  As Gibson (1995) points out with reference to
Zambia:  "...cuts in jobs and services in the rural areas after the copper crash made petty trade in
game meat, and alliances with ivory and rhino horn poachers, even more important to a
household's income... The low costs of hunting and the strong demand for game meat in the cities -
as well as ivory and rhino horn in the international market - made poaching a profitable response
to Zambia's economic environment" (54).

The declining economy forced the Zambian government to redirect its activities away from
wildlife conservation to other pressing issues related to reviving the depressed economy.  This
phenomenon is being witnessed by other African countries who must view wildlife conservation
as a luxury in the face of mounting external debt, high inflation, declining terms-of-trade, and other
shocks to the economy.

Limited Wildlife Preservation Resources

Studies on wildlife conservation have shown that there is a correlation between patrolling of
protected areas and enforcement of anti-poaching laws and the level and amount of poaching.  A
study on rhino and elephant poaching in Zambia concluded that effective law enforcement could
have a positive impact on reducing rhino and elephant poaching, but that limited law enforcement
manpower would dramatically reduce its effectiveness (Leader-Williams, et. al, 1990:1055-56).
Adequate wildlife protection personnel is but one resource that Zambia lacks in its efforts to curb
rhino and elephant poaching.  A major resource limitation continues to be financial funding.  A
report issued by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the World Conservation Union (IUCN),
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service "warns that budget cuts mean that [many animals, including
elephants] are increasingly at the mercy of poachers" (Musa, 1995).  Others have also criticized
that the lack of resources to extend protection activities outside protected areas (such as outside
the Luangwa Valley in Zambia) have led to the continued poaching in these areas (Ridley,
1994:40).

Zambia's depressed economy continues to hamper the government's ability to direct funds and
other resources to affected areas.  In the face of declining revenues, Zambia and other African
countries where rhino and elephant poaching are common, have had to freeze, if not seriously cut
back, funding to agencies involved in anti-poaching activities.  The World Wide Fund for Nature,
for example, "attributes the increase in poaching to the waning interest by governments...[who are]
more concerned with the effects of structural adjustment programs, rising debts, and a looming
drought...; [as well], African Wildlife Departments are grossly underfunded as cash-strapped
governments try to cut spending" (Mwiinga, 1995).

Competition with Local Farmers

Although people in the industrialized countries tend to view African wildlife through the
romanticized lens of Hollywood films, elephants and rhinos are often not seen as assets by local
farmers.  Many farmers must compete for scarce arable land with animals that are quite destructive
to the local farming areas.  Local farmers have often complained that by allowing the elephant
populations to rise too high, "the animals trample crops, create a nuisance, and alienate the people
near their habitat" (Africa: Continent Still..., 1992).

Many local farmers also complain that the establishment of protected areas, such as the Luangwa
Valley in Zambia and the Zambezi Valley in Zimbabwe, do not benefit them, including the very
lucrative tourist industry (Gibson, 1995).  As Gibson points out:  because the tourist industry "was
one of the few industries that dealt directly in foreign exchange, businessmen scrambled to obtain
companies related to wildlife" (63).  But many criticized the operations of wildlife companies
because many believed that "the owners of wildlife-related companies consistently defrauded the
government by under-reporting their foreign exchange earnings and over-charging tourists and
hunters" (Ibid).  Thus, the wildlife tourist industry was viewed very negatively by local farmers
because they felt "excluded from wildlife resources and thought the only beneficiaries of
conservation were the Europeans" (Ibid).  Despite attempts by the Zambian government to ensure
that the revenues from the wildlife tourist industry are returned to local communities, many
Zambians still view wildlife conservation as an exclusive, rather than inclusive, activity.

The Politics of Wildlife Legislation

The wildlife legislation that was in existence in British-controlled Northern Rhodesia laid the
foundation for a national conservation policy that effectively alienated the one group of individuals
with the greatest power to reduce the future desecration of wildlife, including rhinos and
elephants, in Zambia:  local farmers (Gibson, 1995:51-2).  For example, many activities of the
British colonial government in Northern Rhodesia, such as implementing hunting quotas and
license fees, restricting access to guns and ammunition, and establishing protected areas,
effectively "exclu[ded] Africans from most legal uses of and control over wildlife" (Ibid).  In
many ways, the emergence of wildlife policy in colonial Zambia excluded the local residents from
participating in the wildlife economy, thereby encouraging the establishment of illegal activities.
A number of conservationists have argued that unless revenues from wildlife tourism are returned
to local communities, there will be little to no incentive for local residents to conserve potentially
endangered species (Cohn, 1994:72).

The effectiveness of regional agreements have also been limited because of disagreements on
implementation, trans-national political issues, and lack of adequate financial support for
implementation.  Earlier this year, Zambia held talks with Malawi and Namibia on establishing an
extradition treaty to enable the countries to punish cross-border poachers; however, the treaty
remains unsigned as specific negotiations continue (Zambia: Separate Talks..., 1995).  Also in
1995, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, and Swaziland signed the Lusaka
Agreement which will "set up a unit to fight poaching and smuggling of endangered wildlife on the
continent;" however, controversy over the proposed headquarters of the unit, a former base for
death squads in apartheid South Africa, is jeopardizing its implementation (MacKenzie, 1995).
International agreements have also been less than effective.  For example, a report by the African
Elephant Specialist Group, which is responsible for monitoring the conservation of the elephants,
concludes that elephant poaching has increased despite the 1989 international ban on ivory trading
(Clover, 1995:9).

In 1992, Zambia launched an anti-poaching drive that led to the arrest of over 1,500 people and the
confiscation of nearly 1,200 weapons used to poach rhinos and elephants.  Although the poaching
has been reduced in Zambia, a report released in early 1994 concluded that despite these arrests,
poaching is on the rise in Zambia (Zambia's Anti-poaching...., 1994).  Other policies aimed at
curbing rhino and elephant poaching involved making the animals less valuable for poachers.  For
rhinos, this means sawing off the horns which are made of keratin, the same material found in the
fingernails of humans.  But this has not had a dramatic impact on reducing the number of rhinos
killed because, like human nails, rhino horn grows back (about 3 inches every year), and many
poachers kill hornless rhinos out of anger after locating the animals after long searches (Barnes,
1995:T34).

Others have argued that it is corrupt government officials, often themselves involved in illegal
poaching activity, that undermine the effectiveness of anti-poaching laws (Bridgland, 1994:1).  As
Gibson (1995) has remarked:  "Members of the Zambian military and police units, also suffering
from income declines, possess... the weapons and authority to support a great deal of illegal
hunting activity.  A 1980 report by the Zambia Wildlife Conservation Society found
well-documented incidents of army personnel setting up roadblocks at game park entrances.  Army
vehicles, laden with meat and tusks, would be seen driving away later.  Even if not directly
poaching, soldiers and police regularly allowed other Zambians to rent, purchase, or borrow
offficial weapons and ammunition" (55).

The Lucrative Global Ivory Market

The global demand for ivory continues to be very high.  The global trade in ivory remains very
lucrative despite attempts at controlling the trade through bans on sales, establishment of protected
areas, increased law enforcement, and increased penalties for poaching.  For example, in the
Middle East and eastern Asia, ivory dealers will pay $450 per pound (Ibid:63).  In North Yemen,
ivory is used to make dagger handles that sell for $500 to $12,000 a piece (Ibid).  As Margaret
Knox (1989) points out, "pound for pound, rhino horn is more valuable in Taipei than wholesale
cocaine is in Miami" (60).
3.   Related Cases
Keyword Clusters
(1)  Trade Product:  IVORY
(2)  Bio-geography:  Temperate (TEMP)
(3)  Environmental Problem:  Species Loss Land (SPLL)
4.   Draft Author:  Kerstin Moesinger

B.   LEGAL CLUSTER
5.   Discourse and Status:  Agreement and Completed (AGRCOMP)
6.   Forum and Scope: ZAMBIA and Multiateral (MULTI)
7.   Decision Breadth:  9 (ZAMBIA, KENYA, LESOTHO, MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE,
SOUTHAFRICA, SWAZILAND, TANZANIA, UGANDA)
8.   Legal Standing:  TREATY

C.   GEOGRAPHIC FILTERS
9.   Geographic Locations
a.   Geographic Species Domain:  AFRICA
b.   Geographic Conflict Site:  Eastern AFRICA (EAFR) and Southern AFRICA (SAFR)
c.   Geographic Impact:  See Decision Breadth
10.  Sub-national Factors: Yes
The areas under consideration in the multilateral agreement are primarily at the national level
(state-to-state agreements on patrol and enforcement); however, sub-national factors play a role
during discussions of specific protected areas in each of the countries who are a party to the
agreement.
11.  Type of Habitat:  Temperate Plains (TEMPP)

D.   TRADE FILTERS
12.  Type of Measure:  Administration (ADMIN)
13.  Direct vs. Indirect Impacts:  INDirect (IND)
14.  Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact
a.   Directly Related:  YES
b.   Indirectly Related:  YES
c.   Not Related:  NO
d.   Process Related:  NO
15.  Trade Product Indentification
The primary products involved in the poaching agreement are commodities manufactured from
rhino horns and elephant ivory tusks.  These include jewelry and carvings (e.g., dagger with ivory
handles).
16.  Economic Data
Although the importation of rhino horn is illegal in most countries, an "illicit $3 million-a-year
trade flourishes... where dealers pay $450 a pound for the [horn]" (Vollers, 1987:63).  Articles
made from rhino horn and elephants tusks can fetch thousands of dollars in many countries in the
Middle East and Far East.  The international police agency, Interpol, estimates that a $5 billion a
year industry exists in the trade of wildlife and wildlife products (Elephantine Success, 1994).  An
African elephant's remains can be worth $3,500 to $6,500 (Satchell, 1993:68).
17.  Impact of Measure on Trade Competitiveness:  Ban (BAN)
Many dealers in ivory have argued that agreements designed to curb the international trade in
ivory, such as the United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) (of which more than a 120 countries are signatories), have cost their industry millions of
dollars in profits.  For example, the Southern Africa Center for Ivory
Marketing, an ivory cartel including Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, have opposed
the CITES ban on ivory and argue that the reduction in earnings hurt conservation efforts by
reducing the amount of money the national government could spend on illegal poaching activities
(Kelso, 1993:70).  Many local groups also argue that a country should be allowed to determine its
own conservation policies in conjunction with the need to remain competitive in the global
economy.  Thus, a definition of "sustainable use" must be identified which will balance the need
for conservation and the desire to compete in the lucrative ivory market.  Zimbabwe, for example,
has stated that the ivory ban has cut national revenue by $4 million (Ridley, 1994:40).  Other
countries have complained that an enormous resource potential is being lost because they cannot
sell the vast quantities of ivory sitting in storage (Wickers, 1994).  (See USCHINA
Case).
18.  Industry Sector:  Durable Other (DOTH)
19.  Exporters and Importers
     Exporters:  ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE, TANZANIA, BOTSWANA, MALAWI, NAMIBIA
     Importers:  Middle East and East Asia (SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN)
Main exporters of rhino horn and elephant tusks remain Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other East African
countries where the animals are dominant.  Primary importers are Middle East and East Asian
countries who serve as middlemen or import directly for domestic sale.  The United Arab
Emirates and North Yemen have been identified as key transit centers in ivory.

E.   ENVIRONMENT CLUSTERS
20.  Environmental Problem Type:  Species Loss Land (SPLL)
The black rhino has been poached to extinction in Zambia, and is in serious threat of extinction in
other countries, including Zimbabwe.  The three other remaining species of rhino are also in
jeopardy of extinction.  The elephant has been poached to a quarter of its original population in
Zambia and its neighboring countries.
21.  Name, Type, and Diversity of Species
a.   Name:  Four remaining species of rhinoceros; African elephant
b.   Number:  Approximately 4,000 rhino; 500,000 elephants
c.   Species Genera:  Primarily in Zimbabwe (about half of remaining rhino species); elephant
populations higher in some East African countries (70,000 in Zimbabwe) and lower in others (only
2,000 in Malawi and 5,000 in Namibia)

22.  Impact and Effect:  HIGH and STRCT
23.  Urgency and Lifetime:  10 and DECADES
24.  Substitutes:  Conservation (CONSV)

F.   OTHER FACTORS
25.  Culture:  YES
26.  Human Rights:  NO
27.  Transboundary Issues:  YES
Many poachers in Zambia cross the border into neighboring countries to continue poaching when
the number of available rhinos and elephants declines, or there is enforcement of anti-poaching
laws.
28.  Relevant Literature

Barnes, S. 1995. "Horns of plenty." The Guardian, 21 October.

Bridgland, F. 1994. "The end of the rhino." Sunday Telegraph, 11 December.

Cartwright, J. 1991. "Is there hope for conservation in Africa?" The Journal of Modern African
Studies, 29 (3):355-71.

Clover, C. 1995. "African elephants dying despite ban on ivory trade." Daily Telegraph, 21
January:9.

Cohn, R. 1994. "The people's war on poaching." Audubon, 96 (2):70-85.
"Continent still split over imposition of worldwide ivory ban." 1992. Reuter, 1 April.

"Elephantine success." 1994. The Times, 8 November.

Gibson, C.C. 1995. "Killing animals with guns and ballots: The political economy of Zambian
wildlife policy, 1972-1982." Environmental History Review, 19 (1):49-75.

Keller, B. 1994. "Shearing horn of Rhino doesn't stop poaching." International Herald Tribune, 13
October.

Kelso, B.J. 1993. "Hunting for conservation." Africa Report, 38 (4):68-71.

Knox, M.L. 1989. "Horns of dilemma." Sierra, 74 (November/December):59-67.

Leader-Williams, N., Albon, S.D., and Berry, P.S.M. 1990. "Illegal exploitation of black
rhinoceros and elephant populations:  Patterns of decline, law enforcement and patrol effort in

Luangwa Valley, Zambia."  Journal of Applied Ecology, 27:1055-87.

MacKenzie, I. 1995. "African countries get together to save wildlife." Reuter News Service, 13
February.

Milner-Gulland, E.J. and Leader-Williams, N. 1992. "A model of incentives for the illegal
exploitation of black rhinos and elephants: Poaching pays in Luangwa Valley, Zambia." Journal of
Applied Ecology, 29 (2):388-401.

Musa, T. 1995. "Cost-cutting endangers elephant herds." Inter Press Service, 17 February.

Mwiinga, J. 1995. "Jumbos in trouble." Inter Press Service, 27 January.

"Nine African countries sign poaching agreement." 1994. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 August.

"Poachers slaughter hundreds of jumbos in Zambezi Valley." 1995. Xinhua News Agency, 6 May.

Ridley, M. 1994. "U.N.'s protection racket hurts the elephants." Sunday Telegraph, 6
November:40.

Satchell, M. 1993. "Wildlife's last chance." U.S. News and World Report, 115 (19):68.

Vollers, M. 1987. "A war to save the Black Rhino." Time, September 7: 62-3.

Wickers, D. 1994. "Elephants under fire." Sunday Times, 16 October.

"Zambia says Zimbabwean anti-poaching patrols cause 'tension.'" 1995. British Broadcasting
Corporation, 4 August.

"Zambia:  Separate talks with Malawi and Namibia on border security and crime." 1995. British
Broadcasting Corporation, 30 May.

"Zambia's anti-poaching drive bears fruit." 1994. Xinhua News Agency, 14 January.

"Zimbabwe-Zambia to step up wildlife protection." Reuter News Service, 29 October.